North American Network Operators Group

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Re: ARIN whois

  • From: Dean Anderson
  • Date: Tue Nov 23 12:04:51 1999

This has already been discussed with the FBI, and with attorneys. We are right hands down.   The difficulty is doing the collections (actually, finding assets that can be seized) from people who don't want to pay.  But I have insurance industry contacts (the insurance industry really knows how to find peoples assets) and some collection agencies willing to take the task.

Anyway, I'm not willing to argue this with you.  Take this as a statement. You can disagree right up until the tow truck takes your car away.  You can still disagree. 

		--Dean

Around 07:10 PM 11/22/1999 -0500, rumor has it that Greg A. Woods said:
>
>[ On Monday, November 22, 1999 at 14:16:25 (-0500), Dean Anderson wrote: ]
>> Subject: Re: ARIN whois
>>
>> Gee. We operated relay services for almost 4 years with only one
>> incident before this summer.  Since the antispammers started inciting
>> attacks, we've been attacked more than 2 dozen times since July.
>> Coincidence?  I think not.
>
>I think so.  Lots and lots of people are suddenly finding their
>previously un-touched open relays are now being abused.  Just because
>they're suddenly abusing you doesn't mean beans.  Join the group, but
>please stay in line and don't get pushy -- you're no worse of than any
>of the rest.
>
>> Also, there aren't very many _real spams_ in the attacks. The attacks
>> are spamlike, but generally not spam.  But the content of the messages
>> doesn't matter. I don't care if its spam or not spam. Services
>> rendered are worth money.  We are entitled to collect the money
>> regardless of the purpose of the relayed messages. If the money
>> exceeds $5000, the unauthorized access becomes criminal. We complain
>> to FBI. The "relayer" will be found. And we are still entitled to the
>> money for the services provided.
>
>No, you're not.  No contract was entered into, obviously; and of course
>if you didn't protect your services so that they could only be used by
>authorised users then there's not much you can do to the so-called
>"abusers".  This is especially true when there are simple and obvious
>technical means of providing guaranteed protection.  It's like replacing
>the key lock on an unattended service station with a big red manual
>on/off switch and changing the neon sign to read "Free Gas -- Help
>Yourself!"  They're not jimmying the lock because there isn't one!
>
>-- 
>							Greg A. Woods
>
>+1 416 218-0098      VE3TCP      <[email protected]>      <robohack!woods>
>Planix, Inc. <[email protected]>; Secrets of the Weird <[email protected]>
>
>
>
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