


Embracing Failure

Fault Injection and Service Resilience at Netflix


Josh Evans Director of Operations Engineering, Netflix


Josh Evans

- 24 years in technology
- Tech support, Tools, Test Automation, IT & QA
 Management
- Time at Netflix ~15 years
- Ecommerce, streaming, tools, services, operations
- Current Role: Director of Operations Engineering





Our Focus is on Quality and Velocity







We Seek 99.99% Availability for Starts






Our goal is to shift the curve





- Engineering
- Operations
- Best Practices

Continuous Improvement



What keeps us up at night

We're unable to connect you to Netflix. Please try again later.

Try Again

200, 400

Failures happen all the time

- Disks fail
- Power goes, and your generator fails
- Software bugs
- Human error

• Failure is unavoidable

We design for failure

- Exception handling
- Auto-scaling clusters
- Redundancy
- Fault tolerance and isolation
- Fall-backs and degraded experiences
- Protect the customer from failures



No

- How do we know if we've succeeded?
- Does the system work as designed?
- Is it as resilient as we believe?
- How do we prevent drifting into failure?

We test for failure

- Unit testing
- Integration testing
- Stress/load testing
- Simulation matrices

Testing increases confidence but... is that enough?

Testing distributed systems is hard


- Massive, changing data sets
- Web-scale traffic
- Complex interactions and information flows
- Asynchronous requests
- 3rd party services
- All while innovating and improving our service

What if we regularly inject failures into our systems under controlled circumstances?

Embracing Failure in Production


- Don't wait for random failures
- Cause failure to validate resiliency
- Test design assumptions by stressing them
- Remove uncertainty by forcing failures regularly






Auto-Scaling

- Virtual instance clusters that scale and shrink with traffic
- Reactive and predictive mechanisms
- Auto-replacement of bad instances



Circuit Breakers



An Instance Fails



- Monkey loose in your DC
- Run during business hours
- Instances fail all the time
- What we learned
 - State is problematic
 - Auto-replacement works
 - Surviving a single instance failure is not enough


A Data Center Fails



Simulate an availability zone outage

- 3-zone configuration
- Eliminate one zone
- Ensure that others can handle the load and nothing breaks

What we encountered



What we learned

- Large scale events are hard to simulate
 - Hundreds of clusters, thousands of instances




- Rapidly shifting traffic is error prone
 - LBs must expire connections quickly
 - Lingering connections to caches must be addressed
 - Not all clusters pre-scaled for additional load


What we learned

- Hidden assumptions & configurations
 - Some apps not configured for cross-zone calls
 - Mismatched timeouts fallbacks prevented fail-over
 - REST client "preservation mode" prevented fail-over
 - Cassandra works as expected

Regrouping

- From zone outage to zone evacuation
 - Carefully deregistered instances
 - Staged traffic shifts
- Resuming true outage simulations soon





What we learned

- It works!
- Disable predictive auto-scaling
- Use instance counts from previous day



Room for Improvement

- Not a true regional outage simulation
 - Staged migration
 - No "split brain"




Not everything fails completely


Latency Monkey



Simulate latent service calls

- Inject arbitrary latency and errors at the service level
- Observe for effects





What we learned

- Startup resiliency is an issue
- Services owners don't know all dependencies
- Fallbacks can fail too
- Second order effects not easily tested
- Dependencies change over time
- Holistic view is necessary
- Some teams opt out



Fault Injection Testing (FIT) Request-level simulations Service A Internet Edge Service B ELB Device Zuul Service C Device or Account Override?

Benefits

- Confidence building for latency monkey testing
- Continuous resilience testing in test and production
- Testing of minimum viable service, fallbacks
- Device resilience evaluation

Device Resiliency Matrix

_																							
		Scenarios / Features:				_																	
			Activata	Cian un	Cian in	Browse	Bau Link	Rate	Search	Socal	Dlaubaek	Postplay		Legend:									
Points of Failure:		Activate	Sign-up	Sign-in	Browse	IVIY LIST	Kate	Search	Socai	Playback	Postplay	Le	Legena:										
	AB	All													Full functionality	,							
	Cinematch	All						NOTE 1							Limited function								
	DMS	All													Loss of functiona								
	DTS	All				NOTE 2	NOTE 3	NOTE 4			NOTE 5												
1 1	EvCache	All	1											NOTE 1	User ratings are r	not displaye	d and rating fa	ils with an er	ror B20-H4	00			
	GPS	All	1												MDP is blank wit		-				crashes w	hen attemp	ting to rate, or
1 1	Identity (Cryptex)	All			NOTE 13	NOTE 6								NOTE 3	My List loads, bu	t movies ca	nnot be added	removed (N	DP has inv	isible add/	remove b	utton), whi	le shows are o
		All	NOTE 12		NOTE 14						NOTE 11			NOTE 4	MDP doesn't sho	w rating co	ntrol. SDP has a	rating contr	ol, but app	crashes.			
		AuthenticateNetflixIdCommand	NOTE 12		NOTE 14									NOTE 5	Continue Watchi	ng playbac	fails with B27	F8. Playing f	rom MDP is	not possil	ble. Playir	ng from SDF	crashes the ap
		CloseStreamCommandPrimary												NOTE 6	App fails to start	with B1-F8							
		GetOverridesForEsnCommand									NOTE 11			NOTE 7	My List does not	load. Add t	My List fails v	ith B18-H400)				
	[GetSimulationsForEsnCommand									NOTE 11			NOTE 8	My List loads, bu	t Add/Rem	ove results in e	rror B18-H40	0				
	[LogClientInfoCommand												NOTE 9	Searching fails w	ith B16-F8							
Netflix	[NccpGeoLookupCommand												NOTE 10	App fails to start	with B39-F	LO [Sign in] [Exi	t]					
Service	[OpenStreamCommand												NOTE 11	Playback error W8106-151 (Streaming is temporary unavailable)								
	[OpenStreamCommandPrimary												NOTE 12	On start up: Erro	r B33-S1 [Ex	it]						
		SelectCdnsDependencyCommand												NOTE 13	3 Error "500 InternalServerError" [Try again] [Cancel]								
		SetDeviceActivityCommand												NOTE 14 SignedOutPage: no error message, despite register failure.				ıre. SignInf	age: "Stre	aming is t	emporary u	navailable. W	
	[SetLogsCommand												NOTE 15	Continue Watchi	ng section	s missing						
	[UpdateStreamCommand																					
		GetPlayReadyLicenseCommand									NOTE 11												
		All				NOTE 15	NOTE 7																
1 F		All					NOTE 7																
H		All					NOTE 8																
		All																					
- H		All							NOTE 9														
		All																					
	Subscriber	All			NOTE 10																		

Is that it?

- Fault-injection isn't enough
 - Bad code/deployments
 - Configuration mishaps
 - Byzantine failures
 - Memory leaks
 - Performance degradation

A Multi-Faceted Approach

- Continuous Build, Delivery, Deployment
- Test Environments, Infrastructure, Coverage
- Automated Canary Analysis
- Staged Configuration Changes
- Crisis Response Tooling & Operations
- Real-time Analytics, Detection, Alerting
- Operational Insight Dashboards, Reports
- Performance and Efficiency Engagements

It's also about people and culture

Technical Culture

- You build it, you run it
- Each failure is an opportunity to learn
- Blameless incident reviews
- Commitment to continuous improvement

Context and Collaboration

Context engages partners

- Data and root causes
- Global vs. local
- Urgent vs. important
- Long term vision



Collaboration yields better solutions and buy-in



Netflix Open Source Software Center

Repositories

Powered By NetflixOSS

Availability







The Simian Army is part of the Netflix open source cloud platform

http://netflix.github.com

Cloud Management











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