

Possible cache poisoning of mailhandling domains

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We're not entirely sure what this is, but we have a good guess, and we're pretty sure you should care.

What if your MX is not your MX?

This is not theory, this is what we observe on the wire.



What we see

- A NS providing an IP for a domain
- A different NS providing a different IP for the same domain
- You might say that's called a CDN stupid.
- So filter those.
- What's left? The 'bad' stuff.



Who are these misbehaving NS?

Mostly seem to be out of shared-hosting environments, so it's hard to say.

What to do?

- DNSSEC would be the canonical answer
- The user is probably not going to be able to do much
- Enterprise, check (like we did) for NS-served domain relationship being sane (e.g., reputation services can probably do this)



How has this gone unnoticed?

Unless you have big passive DNS collectors, no one organization can detect this because it's distributed.

 You can't notice a discrepancy between two values if you only ever get one value.

Data sharing! Yay data sharing!

Probable causes?

- Compromised hosts pointed to maliciously-created NS
- Compromised legitimate NS
- We're not sure yet.



Questions/comments?



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