AMS-IX experience with RPKI prefix validation

Optional on AMS-IX Route Servers

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Use of RPKI at AMS-IX

• Provide means to distinguish acceptance of prefixes based on origin validation
  • Prefixes advertised to route server are tagged with community depending on validation
    • Auth: VALID, INVALID or UNKNOWN

• Route server peer can, based on community, decide on acceptance of the prefix
  • Have the route server drop on advertisement
  • Accept but process internally
Operational Experience

Active peers: 101
IPv4

Active peers: 69
IPv6

On the default route servers
- 650 IPv4
- 560 IPv6
For 101 IPv4 peers:

- 53 peers prefer to receive all prefixes, but tagged according to ROA status and/or IRR route object existence
- 13 peers prefer to not receive prefixes marked as ROA invalid and/or not registered as an IRR route object
- 0 peers prefer to not receive prefixes marked as ROA invalid
- Similar for IPv6
Why that many RPKI invalids?

- More specifics without ROA 55%
- Assignment to downstream 35%
- Company acquisitions / mergers 5%
- IGP leakage 5%
- Hijack 0%
## Trust Anchors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabled</th>
<th>Trust anchor</th>
<th>Processed Items</th>
<th>Expires in</th>
<th>Last updated</th>
<th>Next update in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>checked</td>
<td>APNIC from AFRINIC RPKI Root</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3 years and 7 months</td>
<td>41 seconds ago</td>
<td>9 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APNIC from ARIN RPKI Root</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>4 years and 11 months</td>
<td>9 minutes ago</td>
<td>27 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Validated ROAs from APNIC from AFRINIC RPKI Root, APNIC from ARIN RPKI Root, APNIC from IANA RPKI Root, APNIC from LACNIC RPKI Root, APNIC from RIPE RPKI Root, ARIN RPKI Root, AfriNIC RPKI Root, LACNIC RPKI Root, RIPE NCC RPKI Root.