



Blackholing at IXPs

On the Effectiveness of DDoS Mitigation in the Wild


NANOG 67

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DDoS Attacks Remain a Serious Threat




What is Blackholing?

- » Operational technique to counter DDoS attacks
- » Triggered directly by IP owners through BGP
- » Last resort to protect upstream/peering link or own network
- » Since a few years also at IXPs (DE-CIX, MSK-IX, NETIX, NIX-CZ, ...)


Blackholing – Brief History

- » Late 1980s: used on a per device basis
- » 2002: within ASes
- » 2005 2007: major ISPs offer blackholing as a service
- » 2010: First IXPs adopt the concept

Recap – Blackholing at IXPs



Recap – Blackholing at IXPs




Is it frequently used and how is it used?


What is the impact on traffic?

How can we improve blackholing?

Blackholing Usage Analysis – Active Announcements



Blackholing Usage Analysis – New Announcements



» High variance in new announcements

» Spikey less specifics (/31 - /18)


- » Blackholing is indeed widely used!
- » But which prefix sizes?

Blackholing Usage Analysis - Prefix Length

- » Mainly /32 announcements (97%)
- » /24 /31 account for 2.5%
- » 9 announcements for < /24</p>


» More specific acceptance needed





Blackholing Usage Analysis – Active Duration


- » Active duration per prefix (/32)
- » Majority is short-lived (~50% <= 3 hours)</p>
- » Longest observed announcement 76.31 days



Blackholing Usage Analysis – Active Duration


- » Majority is short-lived
- » Also very long living announcements

» Could be the same prefix?!




Blackholing Usage Analysis – Re-Announcements per Prefix

- » 7,864 unique prefixes
- » Most prefixes announced once (10%), or between two and three times (15%)
- » Outliers spread from 10 to 100, max 623



Case Study - Impact on Traffic




» Traffic for one /32

» Traffic rises up to 17.6 Gbit/s

» Traffic is reduced by one third

Case Study - Impact on Traffic



Summary

- » 23,000 announced blackholes (over a three month period)
- » Stable number of 1200 active blackholes
- » Observed least specific was a /18
- » Very diverse announcement patterns (frequency, duration, ...)
- » Succeeds in mitigating large DDoS attacks

Full paper at http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/papers/DFK-BIXPO-16.pdf

Future Work

- » Acceptance of /32 blackholing announcements
- » Standardized triggering
- » Blackholing traffic monitoring
- » Fine-grained blackholing

Security Considerations

- » BGP communities can be altered (RPKI/BGPSec won't help)
 - » Strict filtering [RFC7454]
- » DDoS attack through blackholing?
 - » Strict filtering [RFC7454]

- » Resource exhaustion attack against router
 - » No known defense

Standardized Triggering of Blackholing

- » Well-defined community for triggering blackholing
- » First version of Internet Draft available [2]
- » Extended beyond IXPs and more Operational Recommendations added
- » Will become RFC status this year





Comments? Questions?