

An Internet-Wide Analysis of Traffic Policing


Tobias Flach, Pavlos Papageorge, Andreas Terzis, Luis Pedrosa,
Yuchung Cheng, Tayeb Karim, Ethan Katz-Bassett, Ramesh
Govindan

policing-paper@google.com



Slides: <https://goo.gl/GVNRmX>





amazon.com®

bing

YouTube

NETFLIX

Want to accommodate
multitude of services/policies
→ Traffic Engineering



Exponential
growth of
video traffic



Account for ~
50% of traffic in
North America

Want to maximize
quality of experience
(QoE) for their users

Often need high
bitrate with low
tolerance for latency
and packet loss

Traffic Engineering: Policing vs. Shaping

Goal: Enforce a rate limit (maximum throughput)

Solutions:

a. **Drop** packets once the limit is reached

→ Traffic Policing

***Focus of
this talk***

b. **Queue** packets (and send them out at the maximum rate)

→ Traffic Shaping


Contribution

Analyze the **prevalence** and **impact** of **traffic policing** on a **global scale**, as well as explore ways to **mitigate** the **impact** of **policers**.


Outline

1. How Policing Works
2. Detecting the Effects of Policing in Packet Captures
3. A Global-Scale Analysis of Policing in the Internet
4. Mitigating the Impact of Policers


How Policing Works




How Policing Works




Policing in Action




Policing in Action




Policing in Action




Policing in Action




Policing in Action



Policing in Action



Policing in Action



Policing can have negative side effects for all parties

Content providers

Excess load on servers forced to retransmit dropped packets
(global average: 20% retransmissions vs. 2% when not policed)

ISPs

Transport traffic across the Internet only for it to be dropped by the policer

Incurs avoidable transit costs

Users

Analyze the


prevalence and **impact** of policing on a **global scale**

Develop a mechanism to detect policing in packet captures

Tie connection performance back to already collected application metrics

Collect packet traces for sampled client connections at most Google frontends

Analysis Pipeline



Detection Algorithm

Progress


Policing rate

Packets dropped
by policer

Packets pass
through policer


Packets are always
dropped when
crossing the “policing
rate” line

Time



Detection Algorithm

Progress



1

Find the
policing rate


- Use measured throughput between an early and late loss as estimate

2


Match performance
to expected
policing behavior

- Everything above the policing rate gets dropped
- (Almost) nothing below the policing rate gets dropped

Avoiding Falsely Labeling Loss as Policing




But: Traffic below policing rate
should go through



But: Traffic above policing rate
should be dropped

Congestion Looks Similar to Policing!



Packets are usually dropped when a router's buffer is already full

Buffer fills → queuing delay increases

Use inflated latency as signal that loss is not caused by a policer

Validation 1: Lab Setting

Goal: Approximate the accuracy of our heuristic

Generated test traces covering common reasons for dropped packets

- Policing (used a router with support for policing)

- Congestion


- Random loss

- Shaping

High accuracy for almost all configurations (see paper for details)

- Policing: 93%

Validation 2: Live Traffic



Observed only few policing rates in
ISP deep dives

ISPs enforce a limited set of data plans

Confirmed that per ISP policing
rates cluster around a few values
across the whole dataset

And: Observed no consistency
across flows without policing

Outline

1. How Policing Works
2. Detecting the Effects of Policing in Packet Captures
3. A Global-Scale Analysis of Policing in the Internet
4. Mitigating the Impact of Policers

Internet-Wide Analysis of Policing

Sampled flows collected from most of Google's CDN servers

7-day sampling period (in September 2015)

277 billion TCP packets

270 TB of data

800 million HTTP queries

Clients in over 28,400 ASes

To tie TCP performance to application performance, we analyzed²⁶

#1: Prevalence of Policing

Region	Policed segments (overall)
Africa	1.3%
Asia	1.3%
Australia	0.4%
Europe	0.7%
N. America	0.2%
S. America	0.7%

#1: Prevalence of Policing

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Lossy:
15 losses or
more per
segment

Region	Policed segments (overall)	Policed (among lossy)
Africa	1.3%	6.2%
Asia	1.3%	6.6%
Australia	0.4%	2.0%
Europe	0.7%	5.0%
N. America	0.2%	2.6%
S. America	0.7%	4.1%

#2: Policar-induced Losses


Lossy:
15 losses or
more per
segment

Up to 7% of lossy segments
are policed


**Average loss rate increases
from 2% to over 20% when
policed**

Region	Policed segment s (overall)	Policed (among lossy)	Loss (policed)	Loss (non- policed)
Africa	1.3%	6.2%	27.5%	4.1%
Asia	1.3%	6.6%	24.9%	2.9%
Australia	0.4%	2.0%	21.0%	1.8%
Europe	0.7%	5.0%	20.4%	1.3%
N. America	0.2%	2.6%	22.5%	1.0%
S. America	0.7%	4.1%	22.8%	2.3%

Sudden Bandwidth Change Induces Heavy Loss



Sudden Bandwidth Change Induces Heavy Loss




#3: Burst Throughput vs. Policing

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Average loss rate increases from 2% to over 20% when policed

Policing rate often over 50% lower than burst throughput



Quality of Experience Metrics

Rebuffer Time:

Time that a video is paused *after playback started* due to insufficient stream data buffered

Watch Time:

Fraction of the video watched by the user

Rebuffer to Watch Time Ratio:

Goal is *zero* (no rebuffering delays after playback started).


#4: Impact on Quality of Experience

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Average loss rate increases from 2% to over 20% when policed

Policing rate often over 50% lower than burst throughput

In the tail, policed segments can have up to 200% higher rebuffering times



Mitigating Policer Impact

For content providers

No access to policers and their configurations

But can control transmission patterns to minimize risk of hitting an empty token bucket

For policing ISPs

Access to policers and their configurations

Can deploy alternative traffic management techniques

Mitigating Policer Impact

For content providers

Rate limiting

Pacing

Reduce losses during
recovery

Model policers

Share and incorporate data plan information

For policing ISPs

Policer optimization

Shaping

BBR Congestion Control

Bottleneck Bandwidth and Round-trip propagation time

Seeks high throughput with small queues by probing BW and RTT sequentially

Explicit model of the bottleneck

- Track max. BW and min. RTT on each ACK using windowed max-min filters

- Pace near BW (+-25%) to keep throughput high but queue low

- On loss: reduce to current delivery rate but reprobe quickly

[1] *BBR: congestion-based congestion control.*

Cardwell, Cheng, Gunn, Hassas Yeganeh, Jacobson, [ACM Queue, Oct 2016](#)

How BBR Models Policers

BBR explicitly models the presence and throughput of policers

Long-term sampling intervals (4 - 16 round trips)

Starting and ending with packet loss (to try to measure empty token buckets)


Record average throughput and packet loss rates over each interval

If two consecutive intervals with loss rates $\geq 20\%$ and throughputs within 12.5% or 4 Kbps of each other) then:


Estimated policed rate is **average** of the rates from each interval

Send at $\leq$ estimated policed rate for 48 round trips

BBR: Policer Modeling in Action



BBR: a Policed YouTube Trace



Share and Incorporate Data Plan Information

Content providers are unaware of policer configurations

Mobile Data Plan API: Applications can request information about the user's data plan from the mobile network operator

Content providers can incorporate knowledge about a data plan to improve quality of experience

→ Example: YouTube can customize video quality / transmission rates if
policing rate is known beforehand

If you would like to know more, email data-plan-api@google.com. 41

ISPs need ways to deal with increasing traffic demands and want to enforce plans → traffic policing is one option

On a global scale up to 7% of lossy segments are affected by traffic policing

Policed connections see ...

Much higher loss rates

Long recovery times when policers allow initial bursts

Questions? Email us: policing-paper@google.com


Negative effects can be mitigated **Data and tech report:**

<http://usc-nsl.github.io/policing-detection/>

Content providers: Rate limiting, pacing, reduce losses during recovery, model

Backup Slides

Reducing Losses During Recovery in Linux



Send only one packet per ACK

Solution:

Packet conservation until ACKs indicate no further losses

Reduces median loss rates by 10 to 20%

Upstreamed to Linux kernel 4.2

Round trips
(one per

Prevention of Loss During Recovery


Heavy losses can occur even when transmissions have no bursts
→ steady stream of data

When the rate limit is reached, the policer lets packets through at the maximum allowed rate


But: Linux's recovery mechanism can trigger slow start → send two packets for every ACK
→ Sender transmits at twice the policing rate

Adjust mechanism to use packet conservation in the initial recovery round and only slow start if no retransmission is lost

ISP-specific Findings




Each ISP enforces only a handful of policing rates that we (mostly) matched to advertised data plans



Median loss rates: 10 - 25%
95th percentile: 30 - 45%


ISPs: (A) Azerbaijan, (B) US, (C/D) India, (E) Algeria

Interaction with TCP Congestion Control



- (1) Bucket filled
→ unbounded throughput
- (2) Bucket empty → bursty
loss
- (3) Waiting for timeout
- (4) Repeats from (1)


Interaction with TCP Congestion Control



Staircase pattern


High goodputs followed by
heavy losses and long
timeouts

Interaction with TCP Congestion Control




Staircase pattern

High goodputs followed by heavy losses and long timeouts




- (1) Throughput with $cwnd = 1$ stays below policing rate
- (2) Throughput with $cwnd = 2$ exceeds policing rate
- (3) Repeats from (1)

Interaction with TCP Congestion Control



Staircase pattern

High goodputs followed by heavy losses and long timeouts




Doubling window pattern


Flipping between rates since connection cannot align with policing rate

Prevalence

Region	Policed (among lossy)	Policed (overall)	Loss (policed)	Loss (non- policed)
Africa	6.2%	1.3%	27.5%	4.1%
Asia	6.6%	1.3%	24.9%	2.9%
Australia	2.0%	0.4%	21.0%	1.8%
Europe	5.0%	0.7%	20.4%	1.3%
North America	2.6%	0.2%	22.5%	1.0%
South America	4.1%	0.7%	22.8%	2.3%



Understanding Policing



Validation

Accuracy of heuristic (lab validation)

Generated test traces covering common reasons for dropped packets

Policing (using carrier-grade networking device that can do policing)

Congestion (bottleneck link with tail queuing and different AQM flavors)

Random loss

Shaping (also using third-party traces)

TODO: Result summary

Consistency of policing rates (in the wild)

Introduction


Exponential growth of video traffic

Netflix and YouTube streams account for ~ 50% of traffic in North America


Goal for content providers: maximize quality of experience (QoE)

Competing goal for ISPs: accommodate multitude of services and policies → Traffic Engineering


Common Mechanisms to Enforce ISP Policies



Common Mechanisms to Enforce ISP Policies



Common Mechanisms to Enforce ISP Policies



Common Mechanisms to Enforce ISP Policies

Policing

Enforces rate by dropping excess packets
immediately

- + Can result in high loss rates
- + Does not require memory buffer
- No RTT inflation

Shaping

Enforces rate by queuing excess packets

- + Only drops packets when buffer is full
- Requires memory to buffer packets
- Can inflate RTTs due to high queuing delay

Understanding Policing

1. How prevalent is policing on the Internet?

Contribution: Global-scale collection and analysis of packet traces from communication between Google frontends and users.

2. How does it impact application delivery and user quality of experience?

Contribution: Cross-referencing of policed traces with YouTube application metrics.

3. How can content providers mitigate adverse effects of policing, and what alternatives can ISPs deploy?