

ARTHHRAME ON THE ROAD


Waterloo, ON Sept 2016

Core Internet Protocols

- Two critical resources that are unsecured
 - Domain Name Servers
 - Routing
- Hard to tell if compromised
 - From the user point of view
 - From the ISP/Enterprise

DNS

How DNS Works



Why DNSSEC? What is it?

- Standard DNS (forward or reverse) responses are not secure
 - Easy to spoof
 - Notable malicious attacks
- DNSSEC attaches signatures
 - Validates responses
 - Can not spoof

Reverse DNS at ARIN

- ARIN issues blocks without any working DNS
 - Registrant must establish delegations after registration
 - -Then employ DNSSEC if desired
- Just as susceptible as forward DNS if you do not use DNSSEC

Reverse DNS at ARIN

- Authority to manage reverse zones follows allocations
 - –"Shared Authority" model
 - Multiple sub-allocation recipient entities may have authority over a particular zone

Changes completed to make DNSSEC work at ARIN

- Permit by-delegation management
- Sign in-addr.arpa. and ip6.arpa. delegations that ARIN manages
- Create entry method for DS Records
 - ARIN Online
 - RESTful interface
 - Not available via templates

Changes completed to make DNSSEC work at ARIN

- Key holders create and submit Delegation
 Signer (DS) records after securing their zones locally
- DNSSEC users should have signed a registration services agreement with ARIN to use these services

Reverse DNS in ARIN Online

First identify the network that you want to put Reverse DNS nameservers on...

SELECT	DELEGATION	NAMESERVERS	DS RECORD KEY TAGS	AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATIONS
₫	252.149.192.in- addr.arpa.	NS1.ARIN.NET NS2.ARIN.NET NS2.LACNIC.NET SEC1.APNIC.NET SEC1.AUTHDNS.RIPE.NET		ARIN Operations

MODIFY NAMESERVERS

MODIFY DS RECORDS

Reverse DNS in ARIN Online

...then enter the Reverse DNS nameservers...

Manage Reverse DNS

252.149.192.in-addr.arpa.

Using the text fields on the right, specify the hostnames (not the IP addresses) of the nameservers that should be authoritative for ALL the reverse DNS delegations listed on the left. Please note that any modifications will be applied to all listed delegations.

SELECTED DELEGATIONS IN - NET-192-149-252-0-1


HOSTNAMES OF NAMESERVERS					
Nameserver 1:	NS1.ARIN.NET				
Nameserver 2:	NS2.ARIN.NET				
Nameserver 3:	NS2.LACNIC.NET				
Nameserver 4:	SEC1.APNIC.NET				
Nameserver 5:	SEC1.AUTHDNS.RIPE.NET				
Nameserver 6:					
Nameserver 13:					





DNSSEC in ARIN Online

...then apply DS record to apply to the delegation



Reverse DNS: Querying ARIN's Whois Query for the zone directly:

```
Whois - h whois.arin.net 136.136.192.in-addr.arpa
Name:
                252.149.192.in-addr.arpa.
Updated:
                2014-08-20
NameServer:
                SEC1.APNIC.NET
NameServer:
                NS1.ARIN.NET
                NS2.LACNIC.NET
NameServer:
NameServer:
                SEC1.AUTHDNS.RIPE.NET
NameServer:
                NS2.ARIN.NET
KeyTaq:
                18508
Algorithm:
DigestType:
Digest:
                84A741F15E878A088F3884EBE1F0E56EA8599295
KeyTag:
                18508
Algorithm:
                5
DigestType:
```

Digest:

Ref: https://whois.arin.net/rest/rdns/252.149.192.in-addr.arpa.

A9B8659C7795166863DE6FEC47808B58ED0CC6ADB0AA5E25B8F46FE87D3D7CBA

DNSSEC in Zone Files

```
: File written on Mon Feb 24 17:00:53 2014
 dnssec signzone version 9.3.6-P1-RedHat-9.3.6-20.P1.el5 8.6
                                IN NS
0.74.in-addr.arpa.
                        86400
                                        NS3.COVAD.COM.
                        86400
                                IN NS NS4.COVAD.COM.
                        10800
                                NSEC
                                        1.74.in-addr.arpa. NS RRSIG NSEC
                        10800
                                RRSIG
                                        NSEC 5 4 10800 20140306210053 (
                                        20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
                                        oNk3GVaCWj2j8+EAr0PncqnZeQjm8h4w51nS
                                        D2VUi7YtR9FvYLF/j4K0+8gYZ3TAixb9c05c
                                        8EVIhtY1grXEdOm30zJpZyaoaODpbHt8FdWY
                                        vwup9Tq4oVbxVyuSNXriZ2Mq55IIMgDR3nAT
                                        BLP5UClxUWkgvS/6poF+W/1H4QY= )
                        86400
                                IN NS
                                        NS3.COVAD.COM.
1.74.in-addr.arpa.
                        86400
                                IN NS
                                        NS4.COVAD.COM.
                        10800
                                NSEC
                                        10.74.in-addr.arpa. NS RRSIG NSEC
                        10800
                                RRSIG
                                        NSEC 5 4 10800 20140306210053 (
                                        20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
                                        DKYGzSDtIypDVcer5e+XuwoDW4auKy6G/OCV
                                        VTcfQGk+3iyy2CEK0ZuMZXFaaDvXnaxey9R1
                                        mjams519Ghxp2qOnnkOw6iB6mR5cNkYlkL0h
                                        lu+IC4Buh6DqM4HbJCZcMXKEtWE0a6dMf+tH
                                        sa+50V7ezX5LCuDvQVp6p0LftAE= )
```

DNSSEC in Zone Files

```
IN NS
0.121.74.in-addr.arpa.
                        86400
                                         DNS1.ACTUSA.NET.
                                 IN NS
                        86400
                                         DNS2.ACTUSA.NET.
                                 IN NS
                        86400
                                         DNS3.ACTUSA.NET.
                        86400
                                 DS
                                         46693 5 1 (
                                         AEEDA98EE493DFF5F3F33208ECB0FA4186BD
                                         8056)
                        86400
                                 DS
                                         46693 5 2 (
                                         66E6D421894AFE2AF0B350BD8F4C54D2EBA5
                                         DA72A615FE64BE8EF600C6534CEF )
                                 RRSIG
                                         DS 5 5 86400 20140306210053 (
                        86400
                                         20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
                                         n+aPxBHuf+sbzQN4LmHzlOi0C/hkaSVO3q1y
                                         6J0KjqNPzYqtxLgZjU+IL9qhtIOocgNQib9l
                                         gFRmZ9inf2bER435GMsa/nnjpVVWW/MBRKxf
                                         Pcc72w2iOAMu2G0prtVT08ENxtu/pBfns0ZK
                                         nhCY8U0B0YL0LE5Whtk3X0uX9+U= )
                        10800
                                NSEC
                                         1.121.74.in-addr.arpa. NS DS RRSIG
NSEC
                        10800
                                 RRSIG
                                         NSEC 5 5 10800 20140306210053 (
                                         20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
                                         YvRowkdVDfv+PW42ySNUwW8S8jRyV6EKKRxe
```

•••

DNSSEC Validating Resolvers

- www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/
- www.isc.org/downloads/bind/dnssec/

DNSSEC Statistics

	Sept 7, 2016
Number of Orgs with DNSSEC	137
Total Number of Delegations	602,230
DNSSEC Secured Zones	628
Percentage Secured	0.1 %

Reverse DNS Management and DNSSEC in ARIN Online

Available on ARIN's website


http://www.arin.net/knowledge/dnssec/



Routing


Routing Architecture

- The Internet uses a two level routing hierarchy:
 - Interior Routing Protocols, used by each network to determine how to reach all destinations that line within the network
 - Interior Routing protocols maintain the current topology of the network




Routing Architecture

- The Internet uses a *two level* routing hierarchy:
 - Exterior Routing Protocol, used to link each component network together into a single whole
 - Exterior protocols assume that each network is fully interconnected internally



Exterior Routing: BGP

- BGP is a large set of bilateral (1:1) routing sessions
 - A tells B all the destinations (prefixes) that A is capable of reaching
 - B tells A all the destinations that B is capable of reaching




What is RPKI?

- Resource Public Key Infrastructure
- Attaches digital certificates to network resources
 - AS Numbers
 - IP Addresses
- Allows ISPs to associate the two
 - Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
 - Can follow the address allocation chain to the top


What does RPKI accomplish?

- Allows routers or other processes to validate route origins
- Simplifies validation authority information
 - Trust Anchor Locator
- Distributes trusted information
 - Through repositories


Hierarchy of Resource Certificates



Route Origin Attestations




Current Practices



What does RPKI Create?

- It creates a repository
 - RFC 3779 (RPKI) Certificates
 - ROAs
 - CRLs
 - Manifest records



Repository View

```
./ba/03a5be-ddf6-4340-a1f9-1ad3f2c39ee6/1:
total 40
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                       1543 Jun 26
                                    2009 ICcaIRKhGHJ-TgUZv8GRKqkidR4.roa
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                                    2009 cKxLCU94umS-qD4D00kAK0M2US0.cer
                       1403 Jun 26
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                       485
                            Jun 26
                                    2009 dSmerM6uJGLWMMQTl2esy4xyUAA.crl
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                       1882 Jun 26
                                    2009 dSmerM6uJGLWMMQTl2esy4xyUAA.mnf
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                       1542 Jun 26
                                    2009 nB0qDFtWffKk4VWqln-12pdFtE8.roa
```

A Repository Directory containing an RFC3779 Certificate, two ROAs, a CRL, and a manifest

Repository Use

- Pull down these files using a manifestvalidating mechanism
- Validate the ROAs contained in the repository
- Communicate with the router marking routes "valid", "invalid", "unknown"
- Up to ISP to use local policy on how to route

Possible Data Flow for Operations

- RPKI Web interface -> Repository
- Repository aggregator -> Validator
- Validated entries -> Route Checking
- Route checking results -> local routing decisions (based on local policy)

How you can use ARIN's RPKI System?

- Hosted
 - create ROAs through ARIN Online
 - create ROAs using ARIN's RESTful service
- Delegated using Up/Down Protocol

Hosted RPKI - ARIN Online

Pros

- Easy to pick up and use
- ARIN managed

Cons

- No current support for downstream customers to manage their own space
- Tedious through the UI if you have a large network
- We hold your private key

Hosted RPKI - RESTful Interace

Pros

- Programmatic interface for large networks
- ARIN managed

Cons

- No current support for downstream customers to manage their own space
- We hold your private key


Delegated RPKI with Up/Down

Pros

- You safeguard your own private key
- Follows the IETF up/down protocol

Cons

- Extremely hard to setup
- Need to operate your own RPKI environment



Organization Hosted RPKI Terms of Service



AGREEMENT

I agree to the ARIN Hosted RPKI Terms of Service

You must accept the Hosted RPKI Terms of Service in order to proceed.

Access a printable .pdf version of the Hosted RPKI Terms of Service.

Enter your initials

Continue

TERMS OF SERVICE

AMERICAN REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, LTD.
RPKI TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

YOU MUST READ AND ACCEPT THIS RPKI TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT (THIS "AGREEMENT") BEFORE ACCESSING OR USING ANY RPKI SERVICES (AS DEFINED BELOW). IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, DO NOT ACCESS OR USE ANY RPKI SERVICES.

Enter your ROA Request Generation Public Key below.

ROA Request Generation Public Key:

Learn more about the ROA Request Generation Key Pair. Or, just how to create one and extract the public key.

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----

MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvBhoSmbRQhbSpTIM2Pqn hWcHL/6SHORJGCtuoMUS6tVamlqgdTZJw+8POFku+WIOLgUJOEw763rQVTsAq8WZ vs6px2FNr6CJftKAr3fg/T083vHYiMtYJnJbVPKJjdSQSylyUWleR2hYh/4LEOyK MPr3zAuDS2QOI6778OY/kpTEsCrwzp+dM4KtLGOQbyrkfSVIHgux5pCMzsQP/8nP son5vOlkWtkuFNmg8pXgLfEdBR6MC0Y7eKaTeYM6EEJ7rhUCY69SUq+SFmuwYFsg 7YNzRAErF9THpEWqOaOxaSu/4nwLVJ2oexksT6k4hsEWPadxJ0P3E0FHSb/YIfOS fwIDAQAB

----END PUBLIC KEY-----



Hosted Certificates



Information

Each resource certificate entry displays the number of Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), IP addresses or ranges, and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) covered by that certificate, and the date of the certificate's last update. For a listing of data elements for a given resource certificate, select Details.

For more information about resource certificates, visit ARIN's RPKI section.



ARIN

Updated: 03-20-2013

ROAs: ()



Nets: 2()

ASNs: 1()





🧷 Create Roa 🗧 View Resources 🏻 D View Roas 📀 View Details





Create a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) Request for SAMPLE-ORG

There are two ways to create and submit a ROA Request to ARIN:

Browser Signed ROA Request Complete the required fields below and digitally sign the ROA Request using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Signed ROA Request. You must construct a precisely formatted text block containing your ROA Request information, and sign it using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Browser Signed Sig	ned		
			★ denotes optional field
ROA Name:	2		delicted optional lists
Origin AS:	•		
Start Date:	03-20-2013		
End Date:	03-20-2023		
Prefix:	1	Max Length * add	0
Private Key:	Choose File No file chosen	Key Not Loaded	
	This key will not be uploaded to ARIN	l.	

Create a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) Request for SAMPLE-ORG

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Browser Signed ROA Request Complete the required fields below and digitally sign the ROA Request using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Signed ROA Request. You must construct a precisely formatted text block containing your ROA Request information, and sign it using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Browser Signed S	gned		
ROA Name:	Test-ROA ?		denotes optional field
Origin AS:	23456		
Start Date:	03-20-2013		
End Date:	03-20-2023		
Prefix:	70.182.32.0	Max Length *24 add	0
Private Key:	Key Loaded This key will not be uploaded to ARI	N.	
	The Neg Thin 100 aproduced to Fit the		

SUBMIT SIGNED ROUTE ORIGIN AUTHORIZATION

This information will not be saved until you click the **Submit** button below. Note that the signature is used by ARIN to ensure that the ROA Request was signed with your private key. Please verify that the information below is correct. Click **Submit** to send the request, or click **Back** to make changes.

ROA Name: Test-ROA

Origin AS: 23456

Validity Period: 03-20-2013 to 03-20-2023

Resources: 70.182.32.0/24 max length 24


Signature: Hjnse52POzaVFupNDGqYXZVyImr78wSd4A1XEMUpj4vVmpJWWH

nKoZRupDvB2OBtwcJJEyx4KUWPgHUt8VhdCYroyuZGRxJkDtTe q8c0FT2QQdjuD+GmwUWIvtnSD26VZdYUrXM6WniTVwL96UV6sK bJGTx40GqD52tdJq6612QpC6K+Y+JEISgauVyy2htnAPI5rl1Z

GY42Fb9c1CEoE8GmT/FWY+CX6UmKsxJ8LQ0NGR2XUeGKZyc2k5 gKiSCog976Vnltt88/z5jOm1GkYQoQvk6uyy+yYUKreC+GyNqP YyPAvGAq61jYIDXMhDTSjWdGRiV2dNQ8zMmoDOgm9A==

BACK


Submit Signed ROA Request





DOWNLOADS

ASK ARIN

Your ROA request is automatically processed and the ROA is placed in ARIN's repository, accompanied by its certificate and a manifest. Users of the repository can now validate the ROA using RPKI validators.







- You have to do all the ROA creation
- Need to setup a Certificate Authority
- Have a highly available repository
- Create a CPS

RPKI Statistics

	Apr 2013	Oct 2013	Apr 2014	Oct 2014	Apr 2015	Oct 2015	Apr 2016	Sep 2016
Certified Orgs	47	68	108	153	187	220	250	263
ROAs	60	106	162	239	308	338	370	410
Covered Resources	82	147	258	332	430	482	528	582
Up/Down Delegated		0	0	0	1	2	1	2

Q&A

