# Trust Anchor Distribution

Joe Abley, ICANN 22 October 2012



Trust anchors for almost all zones are published in-band, as DS RRSets.

Trust in a child zone's published KSK is based on a corresponding signed hash in the parent zone.

There is one notable zone where this doesn't work.

DNSKEY


alg=7, id=52685

icann.org/AAAA

(2012-10-22 11:11:15 UTC)

icann.org

icann.org/A




DNSKEY

alg=8, id=19036

(graphic courtesy of dnsviz.net)

#### Validators

- DNS authority-only servers don't care about trust anchors; this is a validator thing.
- A trust anchor provides bootstrapping to a validator, akin to a hints file for a resolver





#### Root Zone Trust Anchor

- Publication of the root zone trust anchor is an IANA Function
- Direction provided in the Root Zone KSK
   Maintainer DPS



 http://data.iana.org/rootanchors/

### Root Zone KSK

- The current Root Zone KSK was generated at KSK Ceremony I in Culpeper, VA in June 2010
- Went into production following KSK Ceremony 2 in Los Angeles, CA in July 2010
- The KSK has never been rolled (yet)




## Validator Bootstrap

- Validators need a trusted copy of the root zone trust anchor when they start up
- System Administrators can use packaged tools like unbound-anchor, or just use eyeballs and brain
  - (if you get it wrong, you know pretty quickly, and you can fix it)


#### Trust Anchor Retrieval

Total downloads per month



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
Total downloads per month



# Yes, that's right. 353 million.

### Um.

- Something is going on!
- Does not appear to be an attack, although we were briefly entertaining that idea.
- All the extra retrievals have a consistent user agent string, "CFNetwork/609 Darwin/ 13.0.0"
- The heavy traffic started on September 19.
- Oh yeah.



#### CFNetwork/609 Darwin/13.0.0

- Looks like the extra traffic all corresponds to iOS 6 devices.
- Our traffic was effectively tracking iOS activations and upgrades.
- Looks like everybody looking into this was inadvertently part of the cause.



#### Brave New World

#### before

- Validators with system administrators
- Sysadmins who are capable of determining whether they trust a particular trust anchor
- Ability to respond appropriately if anything ever breaks


#### after

- 12-year-olds
- Grandmothers
- Pointy-haired bosses
- Sales reps
- Lawyers

### Fortunately, we thought of this

- One of the products of KSK Ceremony was a PKCS#10 CSR with a non-standard (but documented) extension list containing an encoding of the current trust anchor
- People would make arrangements to sign that, and we/they would publish it
- Provides a strong chain of trust from KSK
  Ceremony I to the end user

#### http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/



#### How This Should Work

- Retrieve root-anchors.xml
- Obtain links to multiple candidate certificates (trust anchor + CA signature)
- Find one that works, and use it
- Accommodate roll-over
  - passive observation of ./IN/DNSKEY
  - RFC 5011
  - re-bootstrap

# Next Steps

- Continue trying to tell people that this is important
- Listen to early-adopters
  - do what we can to accommodate their constraints
- Keep serving those trust anchors

# Further Reading

- draft-jabley-validator-bootstrap
- draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor
  - both of these have triggered very little interest, but the world has now changed
  - we live in hope

#### Questions?

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