Towards Network Reputation - Analyzing the Makeup of RBLs

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Outline

- Introduction and Motivation
- Architecture
- Key Components
- Uses of network reputation
- Some initial results
- Conclusions


The Problems

- How do you create incentives for the need to run a clean network
- How do you measure the relative security posture of a given network
- How do you balance the need to communicate with another network with the risks
- How can you estimate the likely hood of malicious activity from another network
- Can you assign a risk metric with a BGP path
- You need to know about the historical and current reputation of networks

Desired Properties of a Network Reputation System

- Must take into account a wide variety of network data sources (BGP, DNS, Email etc)
- Must be both passive as well as allow for community participation (must NOT allow a person or small groups to collude)
 - Must include both global and local data sources
 - Must create incentives for people to participate and provide local perspectives on network reputation
- Reputation generation must NOT be responsibility of a single entity or single data source
- Must allow operators to merge global reputation with their own local biases before use in a security policy

Architecture



Key Components

- 1: External Reputation Reports
- 2: Participation Reports
- 3: Global Network Reputation System

Incentive Setting

Data synthesis and weighting

Reputation Distribution

4: Security policies based on network reputation

1: External Participation Reports

- Derived from "third-party" data sources such as spam reputation, dns reputation, botnet reputation sources, darknet scanners
- Generally published globally by neutral third parties not generally related with either the host being reported on or the party that is a potential user of this information
- We have lots of host reputation information of this type. We can use that to derive and seed network reputation fairly easily

2: Participation Reputation Reports

- Many forms of potential reputation data is not visible at the global level – e.g ssh brute force attacks at an enterprise, www brute force attacks visible in local logs
- Self reporting of suspicious activity originating from various customer blocks
- Reporting on local reputation views of specific networks if requested by overall system

3: Global Reputation Example

Prefix	Reputation Index	TimeStamp	Data Sources
1.1.0.0/16	30	2011-02-13:21:45:22	Scan,Darknet
192.168.5.0/24	92	2011-02-14:11:23:12	Botnet,SPAM
12.5.1.0/24	98	2011-02-21:10:45:12	
206.142.0.0/14	75	2011-02-13:21:45:22	SSH, Darknet

- Aggregate and weight different sources of input based on relative confidence in both data type and the reporting party
- Publish consolidated reputation index in a variety of ways, BGP, xml, rss, etc.

4: Reputation based security policies


- Some Interesting possibilities:
 - BGP For each path compute the relative reputation over entire path or the lowest hop AS in any path and influence policy to avoid that path
 - SPAM Scoring use reputation of source in scoring, but more interestingly – bypass other checks if reputation is > 95
 - Inbound Firewall Allow all traffic to regular servers from sources with reputation > 10 but for reputation < 10 send traffic to alternate servers or services, require additional authentication etc
 - Outbound traffic disallow traffic to networks with poor reputation
 - Making DPI viable/scalable for more people normally route traffic for reputation > 30 but for poor reputation sources pass traffic through DPI for further inspection

RBL Characterization


RBL	Data Type	Size (# of IPs)
BRBL	SPAM	100M
XBL	SPAM	7.5M
SpamCop	SPAM	290K
Cymru	CC	243
Shadow	СС	1600
DrkScan	Scanner	170K
BruteForce SSH	Application	65K
DroneBL	Misc	40K

RBLs by Prefix


Per-Blacklist, Number of Prefixes Listed



What is in RBLs - XBL




What is in RBLs - SpamCop




	Country Code	Blacklisted IP Count	% of Listed IPs	Country Name
1	BR	70729	8.66	BRAZIL
2	IN	67542	8.27	INDIA
3	ID	47500	5.81	INDONESIA
4	VN	44611	5.46	VIET NAM
5	RU	30937	3.79	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
6	KR	22831	2.79	KOREA REPUBLIC OF
7	PK	16185	1.98	PAKISTAN
8	UA	15693	1.92	UKRAINE
9	SA	13294	1.63	SAUDI ARABIA
10	MA	13209	1.62	MOROCCO

What is in RBLs - BRBL




	Country Code	Blacklisted IP Count	% of Listed IPs	Country Name
1	BR	20735424	7.73	BRAZIL
2	US	9794242	3.65	UNITED STATES
3	RU	9643239	3.60	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
4	CN	9552575	3.56	CHINA
5	DE	8080633	3.01	GERMANY
6	IN	7397899	2.76	INDIA
7	GB	6535633	2.44	UNITED KINGDOM
8	IT	5872867	2.19	ITALY
9	TR	5244777	1.96	TURKEY
10	VN	4603300	1.72	VIET NAM


What is in RBLs - cymru



What is in RBLs - ShadowServer




What is in RBLs - DarknetScanners



	Country Code	Blacklisted IP Count	% of Listed IPs	Country Name
1	IN	84540	11.33	INDIA
2	RU	62404	8.36	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
3	CN	53570	7.18	CHINA
4	BR	49921	6.69	BRAZIL
5	US	35950	4.82	UNITED STATES
6	TW	24912	3.34	TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA
7	AR	21436	2.87	ARGENTINA
8	IT	15729	2.11	ITALY
9	RO	12078	1.62	ROMANIA
10	UA	12024	1.61	UKRAINE

RBL Overlaps



RBL BRICs

	Country	IP Count on RBL	% of List		RBL Name	
1	BR	9718232	9.04	BRAZIL	brbl	
2	BR	30833	10.60	BRAZIL	spamcop _	
2	BR	635647	8.49	BRAZIL	xbl	
2	BR	19136	11.14	BRAZIL	dsbl	
4	BR	2321	5.65	BRAZIL	dronebl	
	RU	28857	16.81	RUSSIAN FEI		dsbl
	RU	2364		RUSSIAN FEI		dronebl
	RU	23831 8		RUSSIAN FEI		spamcop
_3	RU	471500	5.29	RUSSIAN FEI	DERATION	xbl
5	RU	6981325	5.49	RUSSIAN FEI	DERATION	brbl
1	IN	1212606	16.19	INDIA	xbl	
1	IN	38993	13.40	INDIA	spamcop	
6	IN	4719107	4.39	INDIA	brbl	
2	CN	2627	6.39	CHINA	dronebl	
3	CN	7442328	6.92	CHINA	brbl	
8	CN	205017	2.74	CHINA	xbl	
10	CN	5202	3.03	CHINA	dsbl	

Building Network Reputation- Example

Prefix	XBL	SpmCop	Drknet	RpIdx
59.103.63.0/24	222	3	216	57
59.103.69.0/24	217	8	177	52
202.152.243.0/24	254	154	10	54
83.149.21.0/24	253	124	1	49
85.26.164.0/23	508	229	3	48
85.115.248.0/24	252	81	1	43
83.149.44.0/22	1024	180	64	41
83.149.8.0/23	508	43	76	41
85.26.155.0/24	252	22	38	41
180.245.188.0/22	894	15	0	30

Building Network Reputation- Example

Prefix	Network Owner	CN	RIR
59.103.63.0/24	PTCL H/Q G-8/4	PK	APNIC
59.103.69.0/24	PTCL H/Q G-8/4	PK	APNIC
202.152.243.0/24	XLNET	ID	APNIC
83.149.21.0/24	OJSC MSSPovol	RU	RIPE
85.26.164.0/23	Volga OJSC GPRS	RU	RIPE
85.115.248.0/24	JSC Vimpelcom	RU	RIPE
83.149.44.0/22	CJSC MegaFon Ctr	RU	RIPE
83.149.8.0/23	MegaFon-Moscow	RU	RIPE
85.26.155.0/24	MegaFon-Moscow	RU	RIPE
180.245.188.0/22	PTTelkom Indonesia	ID	APNIC

Building AS Reputation

Network Reputation

Index
View Stats - Top Networks - Top ASNs
View Dataset Graphs - View Geographical Data

#	ASN ▼	Size▼	Owner▼	Index ▼
1	131089	1022	CAT-ISP-4BYTENET-AS-AP CAT TELECOM Public Company Ltd,CAT	52
2	31208	2040	MF-CENTER-AS OJSC MegaFon Network	47
3	18959	6140	AWL-29-AS - The American Way, LLC	45
4	40965	254	NET-UA-AS limited corp	33
5	40775	6140	WIRELESSASPAS1 - Wirelessasperations, LLC	31
6	49908	510	TELEPHANT-AS Telephant Ltd	30
7	22893	12284	CYBERWORLD-INT - Cyber World Internet Services, Inc.	30
8	50604	2046	MEDIASUD-AS SC MEDIA SUD SRL	30
9	20228	12284	PACNET-MX - Pacnet, S.A. de C.V.	29
10	8661	57338	PTK PTK IP/MPLS Network	29
11	23860	16376	ALLIANCE-GATEWAY-AS-AP Alliance Broadband Services Pvt. Ltd.,Alliance Gateway AS,Broadband Services Provider,Kolkata,Indi	a 28
12	49817	510	SKIF-TV-AS TRK Skif-TV LLC	27
	42601		MABNA Gostaresh Ertebatat Mabna (MABNA)	27
14	44798	1022	PERVOMAYSK-AS PP "SKS-Pervomaysk"	27
15	50106	1022	ANTRATSIT-UA-NET PP "SKS-ANTRASIT"	27
	51858		KRAPKO-AS FOP Krapko Olexandr Muhaylovich	27
	46801		DIALWAVE-INTERNATIONAL - Dialwave International	27
	8143			27
	40861		COLONET-SOLUTIONS-ASN - Colo Net Solutions, LLC.	26
	50948		BEHKOOSH Behkoush Rayaneh Afzar Co.	25
	51630		SIABAS-AS SIA BUSINESS AVIATION SERVICES	25
	12327		IDEAR4BUSINESS-INTERNATIONAL-LTD IDEAR4BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL LTD	24
	55812		HOAPDI-NET-PH Unit 202 JMR Building Legaspi St	24
	29117		IRC-HISPANO http://www.irc-hispano.es/	24
25	28373	1022	Bajanet Comunicaciones, S.A. de C.V.	24

Displaying Results From 1 to 25

Display 10 Results - Display 25 Results - Display 50 Results - Display 100 Results - Display 200 Results next

Conclusions

- The goal of the network reputation index is to create a predictive indicator of malicious activity and to allows networks to adjust their own security posture for different networks
- The underlying premise is that network reputation is an indicator of your relative security posture and hence a predictor of future malicious activity
- Initial results and proof-of-concept are promising but a lot of work remains in developing a more convincing method for handling local reputation reports
- Work also underway for developing prototypes that demonstrate the utility of network reputation in security polices