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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: [NANOG] IOS rootkits
On Sun, 18 May 2008, Dragos Ruiu wrote: > > On 17-May-08, at 3:12 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote: > >> On Sat, May 17, 2008 at 12:47 PM, Matthew Moyle-Croft >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> If the way of running this isn't out in the wild and it's actually >>> dangerous then a pox on anyone who releases it, especially to gain >>> publicity at the expensive of network operators sleep and well being. >>> May you never find a reliable route ever again. >> >> This needs fixing. It doesnt need publicity at security conferences >> till after cisco gets presented this stuff first and asked to release >> an emergency patch. > > Bullshit. > > There is nothing to patch. > > It needs to be presented at conferences, exactly because people will > play ostrich and stick their heads in the sand and pretend it can't > happen to them, and do nothing about it until someone shows them, "yes > it can happen" and here is how.... > > Which is exactly why we've accepted this talk. We've all known this is > a possibility for years, but I haven't seen significant motion forward > on this until we announced this talk. So in a fashion, this has > already helped make people more realistic about their infrastructure > devices. And the discussions, and idea interchange that will happen > between the smart folks at the conference will undoubtedly usher forth > other related issues and creative solutions. Problems don't get fixed > until you talk about them. Dragus, while I hold full disclosure very close and it is dear to my heart, I admit the fact that it can be harmful. Let me link that to network operations. People forget history. A few years back I had a chat with Aleph1 on the first days of bugtraq. He reminded me how things are not always black and white. Full disclosure, while preferable in my ideology, is not the best solution for all. One of the reasons bugtraq was created is because vendors did not care about security, not to mention have a capability to handle security issues, or avoid them to begin with. Full disclosure made a lot of progress for us, and while still a useful tool, with some vendors it has become far more useful to report to them and let them provide with a solution first. In the case of routers which are used for infrastructure as well as critical infrastructure, it is my strong belief that full disclosure is, at least at face value, a bad idea. I'd like to think Cisco, which has shown capability in the past, is as responsible as it should be on these issues. Experience tells me they have a ways to go yet even if they do have good processes in place with good people to employ them. I'd also like to think tier-1 and tier-2 providers get patches first before such releases. This used to somewhat be the case, last I checked it no longer is -- for legitimate concerns by Cisco. has this changed? So, if we don't patch the infrastructure up first, and clients don't know of problems until they are public "for their own security" (an argument that holds water only so much) perhaps it is the time for full disclosure to be considered a viable alternative. All that aside, this is a rootkit, not a vulnerability. There is no inherent vulnerability to patch (unless it is very local). There is the vulnerability of operators who don't so far even consider trojan horses as a threat, and the fact tools don't exist for them to do something once they do. Gadi. > cheers, > --dr > > > > -- > World Security Pros. Cutting Edge Training, Tools, and Techniques > London, U.K. May 21/22 - 2008 http://cansecwest.com > pgpkey http://dragos.com/ kyxpgp > > > > _______________________________________________ > NANOG mailing list > [email protected] > http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog > _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list [email protected] http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog
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