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Re: RIPE NCC publishes case study of youtube.com hijack
On Feb 29, 2008, at 11:49 AM, David Ulevitch wrote:
Customers might not like that though... :-)
I don't consider this one of those 'YMMV' things. Today, if providers explicitly filter at all they filter customer routes based on some IRR data or other internal database. They may put a few safety nets in place for bogon prefixes and certain prefix length policies or ASNs, or perhaps not accept their own aggregate or more specifics from peers.
However, they accept everything else from peers, which means tomorrow, when this happens again, all they can do is get pissed because some monkey on the other side of the world fat-fingered a 2 instead of a 3, or forget to attached a no_advertise, no_export or other explicit non-transit community to a blackhole route .. and now some other site "that presumably matters" is offline, or half reachable, or whatever...
Further, we can keep experiencing more extraneous route table bloat because of folks advertising more specifics of their own aggregates in order to minimize any impact a potential hijacking might have to their own space......
Or, we could start implementing explicit inter-provider filtering.
Explicit policy on all inter-domain peers, customer or provider, based on RIR allocations, IRR objects and RPSLish language, and work on removing deployment barriers (e.g., stale IRR data, allocation authentication, IRR update vulnerabilities, router configuration scale and load issues, TTM for newly announced prefixes, etc..), with real deployment likely in an incremental bi-lateral manner between ISPs that employ IRR data for customer route policy today and already have tools to manage and deploy new policy.
I challenge providers to step up here, the onus is on you and nothing else is going to make this problem go away. There's tangible incremental benefit to any provider that institutes such a policy, and by it's very nature, the right ISPs will encourage other sites on the Internet to begin employing IRRs and similar mechanisms, if for no reason other than to enable propagation of their own legitimate routes more quickly.