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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical RE: YouTube IP Hijacking
I figured as much, but it was worth a try. Which touches on the earlier discussion of the null routing of /32s advertised by a special AS (as a means of black-holing DDOS traffic). It seems to me that a more immediately germane matter regarding BGP route propagation is prevention of hijacking of critical routes. Perhaps certain ASes that are considered "high priority", like Google, YouTube, Yahoo, MS (at least their update servers), can be trusted to propagate routes that are not aggregated/filtered, so as to give them control over their reachability and immunity to longer-prefix hijacking (especially problematic with things like MS update sites). > -----Original Message----- > From: Simon Lockhart [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2008 2:07 PM > To: Tomas L. Byrnes > Cc: Michael Smith; [email protected]; [email protected]; > [email protected] > Subject: Re: YouTube IP Hijacking > > On Sun Feb 24, 2008 at 01:49:00PM -0800, Tomas L. Byrnes wrote: > > Which means that, by advertising routes more specific than the ones > > they are poisoning, it may well be possible to restore universal > > connectivity to YouTube. > > Well, if you can get them in there.... Youtube tried that, to > restore service to the rest of the world, and the > announcements didn't propogate. > > Simon >
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