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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: FCC rules for backup power
What? The gov't putting their nose in where it shouldn't be? NEVER! -Mike On Nov 13, 2007 1:00 PM, Wayne E. Bouchard <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Tue, Nov 13, 2007 at 03:07:03PM -0500, Sean Donelan wrote: > > > > > > Proposed new FCC rules for backup power sources for central offices, cell > > sites, remote switches, digital loops, etc. For the first time, the FCC > > is considering specific backup power time requirements of 24 hours for > > central offices and 8 hours for outside plant and cell sites. Although > > most carriers tended to follow old Bell System Practices for backup power, > > BSP's weren't official regulations. > > > > ISPs aren't specifically covered, but .... > > > > <http://www.tessco.com/yts/industry/products/infra/infrastructure/power_supplies/pdf/agl_reprint.pdf> > > I would suggest that these requirements will run afoul of local > regulations regarding the storage of combustibles such as diesel fuel > or other hazardous materials. (Think 111 8th ave and 9/11) This > article seems to take much the same position. > > In short, this, to me, is the FCC putting it's nose where it doesn't > belong. This is not something which should be regulated by this > agency, it should be something done by the various communications > operators in conjuntion with local municipalities. Yes, this means > that there will be variances in many places but the regulations in > place regarding fuel storage and so forth (no to mention batteries for > DC plants, FM200 storage, etc, etc) are there because they are deemed > to be in the best interests of the local community. The FCC has no > idea what those "best interests" are and never will. > > Besides, when you're talking about a Katrina sized event, 24 hours is > meaningless. Normal communications were not restored on many areas of > the region (not just Louisiana) for days or weeks afterwards. And the > assessment of what had occured didn't really begin until after the 24 > hour mark was over anyway. The NTSB learned from its process of > grounding planes after 9/11 that there are some emergency events where > having pre-existing procedures in place can actually be harmful. The > determination was that if there had been a process defined, all it > would have done is slow things down by restricting what controllers > could and could not do. Better to just let them use their knowledge > and experience and act in the best way they know how, given the > situation before them. > > Lets also point out that a generator is most often going to be outside > the building at ground level, wether or not it is contained within its > own structure. And if the generator isn't, there's a fair chance it's > fuel tank would be. Not everyone will be willing to deal with the > expense of burying it. As such, these are usually totally exposed to > the elements and any lowland flooding. Meaning that if something fails > in a facility due to a weather related event, it's probably going to > be the generator. We've all seen that many times before. > > My $0.37 > > -Wayne > > --- > Wayne Bouchard > [email protected] > Network Dude > http://www.typo.org/~web/ >
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