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Re: PKI operators anyone?

  • From: Joe Maimon
  • Date: Wed Sep 05 11:48:32 2007



John Curran wrote:

At 10:06 AM -0400 9/5/07, Joe Maimon wrote:

80 years for the root, 4096bit key
35 years for the policy, 4096bit key
15 years for the issuing, ?bit key
<=5 years for the issued certificates.

Good idea? Bad Idea? Comments?


Joe -
What's the implications of a single issued certificate being
cracked, and again for one of the root/policy/issuing set?

There's quite a bit of speedy hardware out there today
(particularly if you count things like repurposed video
processors) and 5 years is a *very* long time in our
industry. You can actually hunt down the CPS for
most public CA's, and I think you'll find that they put
up with the "loads of fun every 11 months or so..."
However, for them the implications of a compromised
issued cert is potential customer liability, and for an
the issuing certificate or above is basically loss of their
confidence in their entire business of being a CA. You
have to assess the implications based on the expected
certificate use for your CA.

Hope this helps,
/John



Sounds like what you are saying is that creating validity periods based on expected cracking time is an excerise in futility then.

I dont see verisign roots expiring every five years.