North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical what registrars need to do with no incentive [was: Re: On-going ..]
On Mon, 2 Apr 2007, Robert Bonomi wrote: > > > > From: David Conrad <[email protected]> > > Subject: Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names > > Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2007 17:33:08 -0700 > > > > > > On Apr 2, 2007, at 4:56 PM, Douglas Otis wrote: > > > The recommendation was for registries to provide a preview of the > > > next day's zone. > > > > I think this might be a bit in conflict with efforts registries have > > to reduce the turnaround in zone modification to the order of tens of > > minutes. > > This is getting far afield from 'network operations', but the underlying > issue is really quite simple: There are *NO*PENALTIES* for registering > 'bogus' domains. The registry operator has -no- (financial) incentive > to investigate, nor remove, a 'falsified' entry. Once a name is in the > database, _anything_ affecting it is an 'un-necessary expense' to the registry > operator. > > Similarly, there is no dis-incentive to a registrar wih regard to _filing_ a > bogus registration with a registry. Or policy. > > Address _these_ issues, and the domain names "problem" will effectively > disappear. > > One _possible_ approach to dealing with the problem: > 1) registry includes in it's contract with registrars a (non-trivial) $$ > penalty for any registration filed that is found to contain invalid > information. And work a bit harder to make sure the information is valid. This can mean higher costs, of course. > 2) 'formal complaints' to registrar about invalid information must include > a 'filing fee' for the complaint. If the complaint is in-accurate, the > filer loses their filing fee. HOWEVER, if the complaint _is_ valid, the > _original_ filer gets back _more_ than their fee (paid out of the 'fine', > see item 1, above, assessed against the registrar) while any additional > complainants get all their original money returned. Possible variation: > the size of the fine assessed against the registrar for a 'confirmed' > complaint depends on the number of complaints recieved within some > 'reasonable' time of the first complaint -- and all complaints within > that 'window' get the 'bounty' for a valid compliant. > 3) Registrars are charged a _sliding-scale_ of fees, with higher fees based > on the numbers and/or percentages of 'bogus' registrations submitted > recently. (This is similar to the way 'unemployment taxes' are assessed > in the U.S. If there are more claims against your company, you pay > a higher rate than similar firms with lower claims.) > 4) Registrars with higher rates of 'invalid' submissions are _rate-limited_ > as to how fast they can submit registrations. Bulk registration should be limited, or at the very least regulated. Suspending domains registered with a stolen CC (as mentioned) seems natural, doesn't it? > Underlying assumptions: > A) The 'filing fee' approximates the registry operator cost of performing a > basic investigation. > B) The 'fine' assessed against a registrar is signficantly higher than the > actual 'cost' of the investigation. > C) A registrar that has higher per-registration costs is at a competitive > disadvantage to those who canprovide equivalent service at a lower price. > D) A registrar who has to say "We'll take your application now, but we can't > tell you for xx hours (or days) if your application for that name was > successful" is at a competitive disadvantage to one who can tell you > _now_ 'your application was successful'. > > *THIS* gives the registry operator an incentive to 'clean house' -- finding > and eliminating 'problem listings' is a REVENUE SOURCE. > > Similarly, registrars have an incentive to ensure that their _own_ house is > clean. Lack of diligence costs them extra money, -and- places them at a > disadvantage relative to their competition. > > > 'White-hat' registrars can do something similar with regard to registrants. > Registrants fall into three broad categories; (a) those who have never > filed before, (b) those who _do_ have a history of problem-free filings, > and (c) those who have a history of filings where there have been some > problems. > > Those with a 'no problems' history are processed in an expedited manner, > suject to checks for 'abnormal' behavior -- e.g. a radical increase in > the number/rate of submissions. > > Those with no histories are subjected to additional cross-checking/verification, > and, possibly, higher 'new user' charges. > > Those with 'problematic' histories get deferred, surcharged, and/or rate- > limited processing. > > One can 'tune' the rate schedules for 'new users', and 'problematic' filers, > to reflect the "risk level" that the registrar is willing to incur, -with- > the recogition that registrar-level penalties imposed by a registry operator > will affect _all_ registrations through that registrar, not just 'problematic' > ones. > > > 1 >
|