North American Network Operators Group|
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Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
On Sat, 31 Mar 2007, Paul Vixie wrote: > > > ... > > Back to reality and 2007: > > In this case, we speak of a problem with DNS, not sendmail, and not bind. > > > > As to blacklisting, it's not my favorite solution but rather a limited > > alternative I also saw you mention on occasion. What alternatives do you > > offer which we can use today? > > on any given day, there's always something broken somewhere. > > in dns, there's always something broken everywhere. > > since malware isn't breaking dns, and since dns not a vector per se, the > idea of changing dns in any way to try to control malware strikes me as > a way to get dns to be broken in more places more often. > > in practical terms, and i've said this to you before, you'll get as much > traction by getting people to switch from windows to linux as you'd get by > trying to poison dns. that is, neither solution would be anything close to > universal. that rules it out as an "alternative we can use today". > > but, isp's responsible for large broadband populations could do this in their > recursion farms, and no doubt they will contact their dns vendors to find a > way. BIND9, sadly, does not make this easy. i'll make sure that poison at > scale makes the BIND10 feature list, since clustering is already coming. > > at the other end, authority servers which means registries and registrars > ought, as you've oft said, be more responsible about ripping down domains > used by bad people. whether phish, malware, whatever. what we need is some > kind of public shaming mechanism, a registrar wall of sheep if you will, to > put some business pressure on the companies who enable this kind of evil. I have done public shaming in the past, as you know. I'd rather avoid it if policy/technology can help out. Conversationally though, how would you suggest to proceed on that front? > fundamentally, this isn't a dns technical problem, and using dns technology > to solve it will either not work or set a dangerous precedent. and since > the data is authentic, some day, dnssec will make this kind of poison > impossible. Not for the bad guys, unfortunately. :/ Gadi.