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Re: icmp rpf

  • From: Roland Dobbins
  • Date: Sun Sep 24 20:36:34 2006
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On Sep 24, 2006, at 4:33 PM, Mark Kent wrote:

Remember, we're not talking about RFC1918 space,
where there is a BCP that says we should filter it at the edge.
We're talking about public IP space, that just doesn't happen to be
announced outside of a particular AS.
If the intent is to prevent folks from reaching out and touching random network infrastructure devices directly whilst still allowing traceroute to work, iACLs and/or using IS-IS as one's IGP and null- routing the infrastructure blocks at one's various edges achieves the same effect with less potential for breakage:

Note that a good infrastructure addressing plan is a prerequisite for both of these methods.

Roland Dobbins <[email protected]> // 408.527.6376 voice

Any information security mechanism, process, or procedure which can
be consistently defeated by the successful application of a single
class of attacks must be considered fatally flawed.

-- The Lucy Van Pelt Principle of Secure Systems Design