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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical RE: key change for TCP-MD5
Assumptions, assumptions. If your IPSEC is being done in hardware and you have appropriate QoS mechanisms in your network, you will probably not be able to pass your best effort traffic but the rest should be OK. Can we get back to the regularly scheduled programming instead of throwing big numbers around? Barry had a point, if you do IPSEC stupidly, it does not protect you. If you pay attention to detail, it does help. It is not the panacea. For the purpose of securing BGP, I think IPSEC is easy to configure (at least on IOS which is what I'm used to), and will do the job. And for this application, I don't see why cert's can't be used either. Regards Bora > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 1:46 PM > To: Bora Akyol > Cc: Barry Greene (bgreene); Ross Callon; [email protected] > Subject: Re: key change for TCP-MD5 > > On Fri, 23 Jun 2006 13:35:20 PDT, Bora Akyol said: > > > The validity of your statement depends tremendously on how IPSEC is > > implemented. > > If 113 million packets all show up at once, you're going to > get DoS'ed, whether or not you have IPSEC enabled. >
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