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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: Tor and network security/administration
On 6/19/06, Lionel Elie Mamane <[email protected]> wrote: You don't do your financial transactions over HTTPS? If you do, by the very design of SSL, the tor exit node cannot add any HTTP header. That would be a man-in-the-middle attack on SSL. Which, for an anonymizing network, could be a deliberate situation. Tor users are already encouraged to filter through a localhost instance of a second-stage proxy such as Privoxy. There are other projects underway to provide similar second-stage proxy services, possibly capable of functioning as HTTPS m-i-t-m on an intentional basis. If a user desires to filter browser headers even if SSL-secured, certainly s/he would know why the "forged" SSL certificate warning was being presented by the browser. And there's also the possibility of importing such a proxy's certificate into the browser as a trusted CA -- at which point the proxy could generate a "valid" (from the browser's POV) cert for any remote site. All this is an exercise in social vs. technical vulnerability/security. You cannot fix social vulnerabilities via solely technical methods, and vice versa. -- -- Todd Vierling <[email protected]> <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
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