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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: DNS deluge for x.p.ctrc.cc
On Fri, 24 Feb 2006, Estes, Paul wrote: We have recently noticed a deluge of DNS requests for "ANY ANY" records They are trying to abuse similar holes that caused most of us add "no ip redirects" and "no ip directed broadcast" to routers, but this time its about dns of x.p.ctrc.cc. The requests are coming from thousands of sources, mostly our own customers. Why am I not surprised .... http://www.completewhois.com/cgi-bin/whois.cgi?query=28242102&options=retrieveThere are currently no records for x.p.ctrc.cc, or even for p.ctrc.cc. I don't think this is a hacker-setup domain, probably their dns servers were at some point hacked. They are associated with legacy ip block 192.238.16.0/21. It is also notable that CTRC.CC A record points to 192.168.202.72 A google search for x.p.ctrc.cc comes up with only 2 hits. One is a DNS log showing references to this name. The other one shows that somebody else is seeing the same behavior as we are: http://weblog.barnet.com.au/edwin/cat_networking.html However, this site has the benefit or providing a history that p.ctrc.cc had (a week ago) delegated NS record pointing to 321blowjob.com. At that time, 321blowjob.com's nameserver was responding with a TXT record for x.p.ctrc.cc. You might want to consider returning the same thing in lookups as ctrc.cc themselves have for direct A lookups...It would appear that ctrc.cc was the victim of some DNS hijacking. Whatever malware is attempting to lookup this name, however, is doing so at a horrific rate. I have some addresses that have made >250000 requests for this name in a short period of time. I was thinking that I could simply put an authoritative zone for p.ctrc.cc in our nameservers and return something for the lookups , however based on the writeup on the above mentions blog, I am now not certain this will have any effect. As you'll note, that individual had only 2 machines hitting his name server, and even though a response was provided to the lookup, the hosts continued to hammer his access link. When the lookup flood occurs, every host starts at the same time, as can be seen on the graphs of traffic to and load of our nameservers. It's all or nothing - the flood is either on or off. There's no background trickle. Is anybody else seeing these events? --Paul
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