Re: So -- what did happen to Panix?

North American Network Operators Group

Re: So -- what did happen to Panix?

From: John Payne
Date: Wed Feb 01 15:49:58 2006

On Jan 30, 2006, at 5:02 AM, Richard A Steenbergen wrote:

On Mon, Jan 30, 2006 at 09:48:13AM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Wouldn't a well-operated network of IRRs used by 95% of
network operators be able to meet all three of your
requirements?
We have such a database (used by Verio and others), but the Panix
incident
happened anyway due to bit rot.  We've got to find a way to fix the
layer 8
problems before we can make improvements at layer 3.
If an IRR suffers from bit-rot, then I don't consider
it to be "well-operated" and therefore it cannot be
considered to be part of a well-operated network of
IRRs.

The point is that the tools exist. The failing is in
how those tools are managed. In other words this is
an operational problem on both the scale of a single
IRR and on the scale of the IRR system. Is this
what you mean by a "layer 8" problem?
Take it up with the people putting data into the system, not the IRR
operators. Anyone who is behind an IRR-based provider (like Verio) has
motivation to put data into the system ("hey look I do this and now
routing works"), but there is no motivation to take stale data OUT of the
system.

It gets even more fun if you're delegating route-origination to 3rd parties.
Add a mnt-routes: so they can create a route object, but then you can't remove that inetnum block whilst their route object exists (nor remove the mnt-routes).

*sigh*