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Re: New Rules On Internet Wiretapping Challenged

  • From: Vicky Rode
  • Date: Thu Nov 03 12:19:38 2005

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in-line:

Adam Chesnutt wrote:
> This whole thread is silly! It's not hard to trap and trace a suspect. 
> It doesn't require a "Whole new generation of routers and switches"
- --------------
That was exactly my understanding but I think it goes beyond that.

> 
> Correct me if I'm wrong here, but it seems to me that it's a fairly 
> trivial task to mirror and upstream, and isolate the traffic required. 
> I've performed such taps before and usually find it to easily performed 
> with a single FreeBSD box, and a mirrored port on the router.
- ---------------
true enough.


> 
> Or maybe I'm just missing the point of this thread.
- ---------
You might want to take a look at rfc 2804 for some background.


regards,
/virendra

> 
> Flounder
> 
> 
> Vicky Rode wrote:
> 
> 
> comments in-line:
> 
> 
> Peter Dambier wrote:
>  
> 
> 
>>Vicky Rode wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>>...Raising my hand.
> 
>>>My question is on Terry Hartle's comments, maybe someone with more
>>>insight into this could help clear my confusion.
> 
>>>Why would it require to replace every router and every switch when my
>>>understanding is, FCC is looking to install *additional* gateway(s) to
>>>monitor Internet-based phone calls and emails.
>>>     
> 
> 
>>In a datacenter you have lines coming in and lines going out. And you
>>have internal equippment.
> 
>>You have to eavesdrop on all of this because the supposed terrorist
>>might come in via ssh and use a local mail programme to send his email.
> 
> 
> 
> --------------
> How do you differentiate between a hacker and a terrorist?
> 
> For all you know this so called "terrorist" might be coming from a
> spoofed machine(s) behind anyone's desk.
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
>>So you have to eavesdrop on all incoming lines because you dont know
>>where he comes in. Via aDSL? via cable modem? Via a glass fiber?
> 
>>And you have to monitor all internal switches because you dont know
>>which host he might have hacked.
> 
>>Guess a cheap switch with 24 ports a 100 Mbit. That makes 2.4 Gig.
>>You have to watch all of these. They can all send at the same time.
>>Your switch might have 1 Gig uplink. But that uplink is already in
>>use for your uplink and it does not even support 2.4 Gig.
> 
> 
> 
> -------------
> There are ways to address over-subscription issues.
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
>>How about switches used in datacenters with 48 ports, 128 ports, ...
>>Where do you get the capacity for multiple Gigs just for eavesdropping?
> 
>>On the other hand - most switches have a port for debugging. But this
>>port can only listen on one port not on 24 or even 48 of them.
> 
>>So you have to invent a new generation of switches.
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------
> I don't believe this is the primary reason for replacing every router
> and every switch.
> 
> I think (correct me if I'm wrong) it has to do with the way wiretap
> feature (lack of a better term) that .gov is wanting vendors to
> implement within their devices, may be at the network stack level.
> 
> I guess it's time to revisit rfc 2804.
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
>>How about the routers? They are even more complicated than a switch.
> 
>>As everybody should know by now - every router can be hacked. So
>>your monitoring must be outside the router.
> 
>>The gouvernment will offer you an *additional* gateway.
>>I wonder what that beast will look like. It must be able to take
>>all input you get from a glass fiber. Or do they ask us to get
>>down with our speed so they have time to eavesdrop.
> 
> 
> 
> -----------------
> powered by dhs w/ made in china sticker :-)
> 
> I'm not being smarty pants about this...it is actually happening. That's
> all I can say.
> 
> 
> 
> regards,
> /virendra
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>>I can see some sort of
>>>network redesign happening in order to accodomate this but replacing
>>>every router and every switch sounds too drastic, unless I
>>>mis-understood it. Please, I'm not advocating this change but just
>>>trying to understand the impact from an operation standpoint.
> 
>>>     
> 
> 
>>Yes, it is drastic. But if they want to eavesdrop that is the only
>>way to do it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>>Any insight will be appreciated.
> 
> 
> 
>>>regards,
>>>/virendra
> 
>>>     
> 
> 
>>Here in germany we accidently have found out why east germany had
>>to finally give up:
> 
>>They installed equippement to eavesdrop and tape on every single
>>telefone line. They could not produce enough tapes to keep up
>>with this :)
> 
>>Not to mention what happened when they "recycled" the tapes and
>>did not have the time to first erase them :)
> 
> 
>>Kind regards,
>>Peter and Karin
> 
> 
> 
> 
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