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Re: Why do so few mail providers support Port 587?
In message <[email protected]>, Sean Donelan writes: >Requiring end-user computers to use authenticated Port 587 and blocking >end-user computers access to port 25 has several advantages: > > 2. Lets the authenticated mail server conduct additional >anti-virus checks on outgoing mail even if the end-user's computer was >compromised or out-of-date virus definitions. > 3. Separates authenticate mail submission (port 587) from other >mail protocols (25, 110, 143, etc) simplfying network controls (no >deep-packet inspection) for end-user computers. Eliminates some of the >existing problems with trying to do transparent proxying of port 25 from >end-user computers. What these two boil down it is a much simpler mail system architecture, which in turn translates to a more secure mail system and an easier-to-administer one. Consider the control flow if you're trying to use port 25 for everything: Send a 220 If you see an EHLO, advertise that you support STARTTLS If you receive a STARTTLS and another EHLO, advertise that you support AUTH -- you don't want to do authentication over insecure connections, especially if your goal is to support roaming wireless users. Accept inbound email. Check if the user was authenticated. If so, permit relaying; also do rate checks. If not, don't permit relaying, but do run anti-spam software. Do virus checks. If authenticated, notify the sender that either their machine is infested with *something* or their credentials have been stolen. If unauthenticated, discard; it's probably a joe job. The point is that authenticated status has to be retained and checked frequently. If you're using 587, the subscriber flow is like this: Send a 220 Don't accept anything until you see STARTTLS Don't do anything until you see an AUTH Accept inbound mail, do rate checks and virus checks, and bounce accordingly For port 25: Send a 220 Optionally permit (but don't require) STARTTLS Accept inbound mail. Do virus and spam checks, and drop as needed. Don't permit relaying Both are simpler; neither requires retained global state.