|
North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical RE: Proper authentication model
> -----Original Message----- > From: Joe Abley [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 12:05 PM > To: Hannigan, Martin > Cc: NANOG list > Subject: Re: Proper authentication model > > > > On 12 Jan 2005, at 11:53, Hannigan, Martin wrote: > > >> You mean you'd *request* a different path from different providers. > > > > Provisioning a circuit from two different ^providers^, other than > > your OC3 provider. > > I realise that's what you meant. > > My point was that competing, differently-named and > organisationally-separate suppliers of network services > frequently use > common suppliers for metro fibre, long-haul transport, > building access, > etc. Just because you buy different services from different providers > doesn't mean there will be no common points of failure. There may be common points of failure like a carrier hotel, but I haven't been told I couldn't see loop or longhaul maps when planning a circuit, except when buying from other than a carrier[1] or tier2. Primary and protect should be geographically seperated and if your carrier isn't buying access to BOTH conduits in your entrance facility, you should ask why. I just don't usually see this problem and I've *never* not been able to get into a facility remotely by the diversified frame M/S method. If we're talking semantics, order type 2 ds0s. [1] I'm talking RBOC tier1 for the most part. I would consider tier 1 to be SBC, AT&T, MCI, Sprint, etc. Facilities based. -M<
|