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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: Proper authentication model
Kim, Its terribly important that your routers' management traffic be encrypted all the way to the device. For this reason, the best practice is to use ssh2. There are some other hacks that can be used, but they are hacks, and are not scalable. Bastion hosts are a good thing and can be a great place to put in checks for multi-factor authentication (another must-have), but they do not replace the need for end-to-end encryption. Turn off telnet and web administration today. While you are at it, look at your SNMP setup. You want your SNMP management to have the same characteristics as your vty management - strong authentication and encryption. Cleartext community strings don't cut it, as an example. Also, you need a secure Out of Band management network. You may want to check out the NSP-Security mail list. - Dan On 1/11/05 4:17 AM, "Kim Onnel" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hello, > I'd like everyones 2 cents on the BCP for network management of an ISP > PoPs, with a non-security oriented NOC, > > Most of my routers doesnt have crypto IOS images, > couldnt agree with core members to do a major upgrade, just a promise > of doign that when other needs to an IOS upgrade come up, > So i need to workaround it and secure management traffic somehow, > > Usually the NOC logs to the PoPs 24x7, so i definitely need to hit a > balance between encryption/security and usability, > thats why i excluded OTP, > > My homework concluded: > > 1) Establishing an ipsec tunnel from each NOC Pc to a VPN > concentrator, and of course on every PC, there would be static routes > injected to take management traffic through the tunnel, > > Major advantage is usability and transperancy to the user, > One major pitfall here is when ipsec tunnels break, my presence would > be needed to troubleshoot that, > > 2) An OpenBSD bastion host(s), where the NOC would ssh in, get > authenticated from TACACS+ or ssh certs, and then just telnet from > there all day, > > One major advantage here is the heavy monitoring/limiting i can do on > a *nix box, systrace their login shell to a policy > (telnet/ping/traceroute only) > > 3) Or just an IOS based bastion router that also runs ssh, > > > This has the advantage of IOS limitations in a way, not much > maintaining is needed but being limited with 16 vtys is a problem, > also vtys may get stuck and all these ssh sessions would kill the > memory of the router, > > I would of course have multiple setups one at the Datacenter, another > at some PoP, redundant solutions incase one fails, > > and For the record, I do run rancid, syslogging and we do AAA, so its > just down to whats others experiences/ideas about secure management?
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