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Re: Wired mag article on spammers playing traceroute games with trojaned boxes

  • From: Vinny Abello
  • Date: Thu Oct 09 12:16:45 2003

At 11:51 AM 10/9/2003, Chris Boyd wrote:


On Thursday, October 9, 2003, at 10:04  AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:

http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,60747,00.html

--
srs (postmaster|suresh)@outblaze.com // gpg : EDEDEFB9
manager, outblaze.com security and antispam operations


I found one of these today, as a matter of fact. The spam was advertising an anti-spam package, of course.

The domain name is vano-soft.biz, and looking up the address, I get

Name: vano-soft.biz
Addresses: 12.252.185.129, 131.220.108.232, 165.166.182.168, 193.165.6.97
12.229.122.9

A few minutes later, or from a different nameserver, I get

Name: vano-soft.biz
Addresses: 131.220.108.232, 165.166.182.168, 193.165.6.97, 12.229.122.9
12.252.185.129

This is a real Hydra. If everyone on the list looked up vano-soft.biz and removed the trojaned boxes, would we be able to kill it?
They're using extremely low TTL's on most of their records. Typically 2 minutes to accomplish this. The thing is I would imagine at least ONE of those NS servers cannot change within a 2 hour window whereas the others can change every 2 minutes. If you identify the server that only changes every 2 hours and track what it's replaced with every 2 hours, you're likely to find a rotating list of master servers... Another question is why is NeuLevel (the registrar for .biz) allowing TTL's on the NS records to be 2 hours and submitting those to the GTLD servers. Maybe it's just me, but that's the first time I've seen a registrar set such a low TTL on an NS record. If NeuLevel is any good they would likely have some sort of information to identify the owner of the domain, even if the information is invalid listed on their whois server. They might have a credit card transaction although that too could always be a stolen credit card number.

Any other ideas or different angles/experiences?

; <<>> DiG 9.2.2 <<>> +trace a vano-soft.biz.
;; global options: printcmd
. 80336 IN NS l.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS m.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS i.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS e.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS d.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS a.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS h.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS c.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS g.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS f.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS b.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS j.root-servers.net.
. 80336 IN NS k.root-servers.net.
;; Received 449 bytes from 216.182.1.1#53(216.182.1.1) in 40 ms

biz. 172800 IN NS A.GTLD.biz.
biz. 172800 IN NS B.GTLD.biz.
biz. 172800 IN NS C.GTLD.biz.
biz. 172800 IN NS D.GTLD.biz.
biz. 172800 IN NS E.GTLD.biz.
biz. 172800 IN NS F.GTLD.biz.
;; Received 228 bytes from 198.32.64.12#53(l.root-servers.net) in 270 ms

vano-soft.biz. 7200 IN NS NS1.UZC12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 7200 IN NS NS2.UZC12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 7200 IN NS NS3.UZC12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 7200 IN NS NS4.UZC12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 7200 IN NS NS5.UZC12.biz.
;; Received 223 bytes from 209.173.53.162#53(A.GTLD.biz) in 150 ms

vano-soft.biz. 120 IN A 200.80.137.157
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN A 12.229.122.9
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN A 12.252.185.129
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN A 165.166.182.168
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN A 193.92.62.42
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN NS ns5.uzc12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN NS ns1.uzc12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN NS ns2.uzc12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN NS ns3.uzc12.biz.
vano-soft.biz. 120 IN NS ns4.uzc12.biz.
;; Received 287 bytes from 204.210.76.197#53(NS4.UZC12.biz) in 130 ms

Vinny Abello
Network Engineer
Server Management
[email protected]
(973)300-9211 x 125
(973)940-6125 (Direct)
PGP Key Fingerprint: 3BC5 9A48 FC78 03D3 82E0 E935 5325 FBCB 0100 977A

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