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RE: Kill Verisign Routes :: A Dynamic BGP solution

  • From: Eric Germann
  • Date: Fri Sep 19 08:09:19 2003

I guess we don't really need to discuss the political ramifications, because
I don't really care about VS.  Our internal policy is to kill the route to
the host.  I'm offering up a tool to implement a technical solution to
killing the route.  Nothing more, nothing less.  It only affects our
internal network, so we don't really have a global impact, unlike some folks
in Virgina.  If people want it, its here.  If not, they're free to delete
this.  Key is, they have choice.

Eric


> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Schwartz [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Friday, September 19, 2003 4:04 AM
> To: J.A. Terranson
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: RE: Kill Verisign Routes :: A Dynamic BGP solution
>
>
>
> > On Thu, 18 Sep 2003, David Schwartz wrote:
>
> > > 	I think the whole idea of getting into an escalating
> > > technical war with
> > > Verisign is extremely bad. Your suggestion only makes sense if
> > > you expect
> > > Verisign to make changes to evade technical solutions. Each
> > > such change by
> > > Verisign will cause more breakage. Verisign will either
> provide a way to
> > > definitively, quickly, and easily tell that a domain is not
> > > registered or
> > > Verisign will badly break COM and NET.
>
> > > 	DS
>
> > With all due respect, this line of logic is the same one used
> in the US to
> > prevent people from defending themselves from other types of
> > crime, and it's totally bogus.
>
> 	Really? I've never seen anyone attempt such an argument,
> but it would be
> rather amusing to see. Which part would you use?
>
> 	Would you argue that criminals aren't likely to take steps
> that obviously
> are attempts to reduce the effectiveness of guns? And if they do,
> they will
> have to deal with the likely PR and government pressure that would result.
>
> 	The whole point here is that it's not clear to everyone
> that Verisign is
> analogous to the criminal. The point is to make it clear that they are and
> that won't happen if you look very much like them.
>
> > We have been, in a literal sense, attacked by Verislime, any and
> > all defenses
> > are appropriate.
>
> 	No. The defenses have to be reasonable and have to avoid
> collateral damage
> to innocent parties. If not, Verisign will have a reasonable argument that
> we are the bad guys. They caused some breakage? So what, so did we. They
> distorted the true data that should have been in the zone? So what, so did
> we.
>
> 	You are welcome to see this as an attack, but the response
> should not be
> out of proportion. If a measured response leads to an escalation, then you
> can consider "any and all defenses".
>
> 	DS
>
>
>