North American Network Operators Group

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Re: WANTED: ISPs with DDoS defense solutions

  • From: Mike Tancsa
  • Date: Wed Jul 30 19:41:07 2003

At 10:37 PM 30/07/2003 +0000, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:

Sure, trace my attacks to the linux box at UW, I didn't spoof the flood
and you can prove I did the attacking how?
You can at least TRY and see where the controlling traffic stream is originating from. i.e. if crap is coming out of box X, all the effort is spent on dealing with the spew coming from X through clever filtering and null routing, rather than trying to figure out who is controlling X. Good grief, is it really that difficult to put on an acl to log inbound tcp setup connections to the attacking host ?
"Proof" in a legal sense is probably impossible if its some kid in Kiev and highly cost prohibitive if its some kid in Boston and you are in New York. But you know what, the odds are it is from a western country and odds are its not some politically motivated attack, its some emboldened kid due to the anonymity of the Internet, pissed off that someone questioned his manhood on IRC and decides to take it out via some ego enlarging attack. In the cases we have dealt with where it was one of our customers, contacting the parents and explaining that what was being done was against the law, was enough to stop the kid from continuing. Even when the attacker was an adult, talking to the person, explaining its against our AUP and against the law was, in our cases, enough to stop the person. Its amazing how compliant and timid [email protected] becomes when you talk to [email protected]


Are all these incidents bored teenage kids ? No. But I would put money on it the majority are. Really, how many of the very clever hackers you know are involved in DDoS attacks ?

You can't because I and 7 other
hackers all are fighting eachother over ownership of the poor UW student
schlep's computer...
Great, so of the 7 inbound streams, what effort is it to identify the IP address ? In our case
ipfw add 20 count log tcp from any to x.x.x.x setup

will it always work ? no. But it will catch more attackers than clever routing and filtering, as that just copes with the issue and does nothing to deal with it.



The problem isn't the network, nor the filtering/lack-of-filtering, its a
basic end host security problem.

I would say all have some responsibility. Its not just an end user problem, its not just a network operator problem. I would say a DDoS would violate everyone's AUP on this list no ? If you choose to not enforce your AUP, how are you not responsible ? This is like the cops saying, "people are going to drive drunk and do stoooopid things. We cant stop them from doing this, so we give up"


Until that is resolved, the ability of
attackers to own boxes in remote locations and use them for malfeasance
will continue to haunt us. I would guess that the other owners of the
machines attacking Mike (assuming they got the emails he sent...
I sent email to the listed abuse contacts first. If that bounced (as it did with several korean networks) I contacted the AS, or RADB contacts. I even contacted the APNIC registrar to inform them that all contacts bounced for one of the Korean ISPs. I then asked a Korean friend to look around the website for a "real person" and emailed that address. But the majority of the infected hosts were (surprise, surprise) in the largest networks e.g. AT&T, TW, Comcast, colo providers, and other resi broadband providers in Japan, Korea and Canada. Not because they have the lion's hare of dumb users, but because they have the lion's share of users period. Almost all had auto-responders saying "if spam, email here, if network abuse, email here"... If it was a different address, I then re-sent the complaints to the address instructed.



big
assumption) probably said: "Great another person getting attacked from
that joker's win2k machine, hurray:(" and moved on about thier business.
We dont do this. If a customer host is infected with virus/worm or is used in an attack, we contact the customer. If they dont do anything or choose to ignore us, we cut them off.



I'm all for raising the bar on attackers and having end networks implement
proper source filtering, but even with that 1000 nt machines pinging 2
packet per second is still enough to destroy a T1 customer, and likely
with 1500 byte packets a T3 customer as well. You can't stop this without
addressing the host security problem...

And kids will continue to attack / cause problems with impunity when there are no consequences for their actions. If network operators would enforce their AUPs, I think we would go a long way to reduce these types of headaches. This starts with putting *some* effort into identifying the controlling source.

---Mike