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RE: Spam from weird IP 118.189.136.119

  • From: Lars Higham
  • Date: Tue Jun 17 00:51:55 2003

Okay, but what's the trojan signature look like?

How should people be checking to see if they're compromised?

-----Original Message-----
From: John Brown [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2003 10:12 AM
To: Lars Higham
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Spam from weird IP 118.189.136.119


I name this 

Weird-118rr


On Tue, Jun 17, 2003 at 09:48:07AM +0530, Lars Higham wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> It would be useful if this exploit could be named and documented at 
> least for one known instance -
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Lars Higham
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf 
> Of Richard D G Cox
> Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 9:32 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: Spam from weird IP 118.189.136.119
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 17:33:11 +0200, "Pascal Gloor" 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> | Getting SPAM from 118.189.136.119 relayed by rr.com ?
> |
> | this network is not allocated, nor announced. I have been looking
> | everywhere to find if it has been announced (historical bgp update 
> | databases, like RIS RIPE / CIDR REPORT / etc..)... I didnt found 
> | anything.... this probably mean rr.com is routing that network 
> | internaly.
> 
> This is very likely to be a known exploit I have been tracking.  In 
> all the cases which we have so far confirmed, the spam was not 
> relayed, but proxied by a trojan executable which is able to mimic a 
> "previous" header with such a degree of accuracy that it is 
> indistinguishable from the genuine article!
> 
> | If there is any rr.com guy around. Could you please check this?
> 
> Our advice would be that the server-that-connected-to-you needs to be 
> taken offline by the security people at its site (which you say is
> RoadRunner) and they should have ALL its disk(s) imaged for forensic 
> analysis purposes.
> 
> Our experience is that sites hit by this exploit will do basic checks 
> on the server and claim it is uncompromised and "cannot possibly be 
> sending that spam".  Such a claim would be entirely incorrect.  You 
> would need to persuade them that something is wrong, which is 
> difficult at the best of times.  RoadRunner being involved in this 
> case suggests this may
> *not* be the "best of times".
> 
> --
> Richard Cox
>