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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical RE: AT&T NYC
> > You keep referring to the problem of OSPF causing the outage > for AT&T and unaffected customers. The AT&T released RFO simply states > that OSPF network statements were removed. That can happen just as easy > with static routes and BGP network/neighbor statements. > > OSPF did what it was instructed to do, just as BGP would have done if it > were told to drop neighbors, or networks. OSPF network statements were removed, according to RFO, which I have received, on one router. Can you please explain to me why customers in other *cities* which clearly were terminated into different routers were affected? Since we know based on our emprirical observation that it did happen, it can be concluded that AT&T has bad network design. It does not matter *why* customers who were not terminated into the affected routers could not use AT&T network. What matters is that they *could* b not use AT&T's network because AT&T's engineering made a choice of using a broken design. This broken design is going to cost AT&T a couple of million. Hopefully, at some point a VP of Engineering for AT&T is going to realize that his job is going to be on the line if stuff like this keeps happening, at which point certain engineers within AT&T are going to get their heads handed back to them on a platter. Again, hopefully at that point, those who remain at AT&T will realize that their existing design is broken and another outage is going to cost them their jobs and redo it. At the end we are going to have a lot more stability on the internet. As far as BGP would have done the same thing: would you mind desciring a configuration of BGP where deletion of a network statement in one router would cause unreachability across paths that do not *realy* on that network statement? Alex
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