|
North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical RE: Internet vulnerabilities
How about this: ISP X had its tftp server compromised by a wily hacker who evaded tripwire and covered his track well, uploaded some cracked Cisco code (the current release for their GSRs). This code was designed to corrupt the directories and shut down the router at date XX:XX:XX. Each of these affected GSRs, 7-five new roll-outs and 2 upgrades--went down at the same time (save one who's time was no set correctly). Each site had to driven to, flashcards replaced. ISP X severely crippled for 6 hours. The hacker could have gone the extra leg to have the tftp server expunge the backup configs at the same time--extra couple hours--but did not. We all download code from Cisco/Juniper/Bay in good faith... when's the last time you saw a signature attached to any of those? Most security breeches happen from within anyway. A disgruntled DE.... Just a wicked thought. j -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of batz Sent: Thursday, July 04, 2002 2:17 PM To: Jason Lewis Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: Internet vulnerabilities On Thu, 4 Jul 2002, Jason Lewis wrote: :What are the real threats to the global Internet? I realize this seems like nitpicking, but asking what the real risks are might be a more useful question. The reason I mention this is because the washington post report the other day about threats to SCADA systems was blown out of proportion, because it equated the seriousness of the threats with their associated risks. Yes, most ASN.1 implementations have serious vulnerabilities, welcome to 1988. The ASN.1 vulnerabilities being talked about right now are serious threats, but lower risk than say, millions of unpatched IIS and apache servers, public exploits and a worm on the loose. Application level vulnerabilities that have to be patched on a host by host basis, cause a greater risk than say, SNMP vulnerabilities that can be filtered at the gateway, which protects from opportunistic external attacks. When you talk about threats to the global Internet, there are hundreds of equally serious vulnerabilities of varying risk. Also, the "global Internet" has many different meanings. It can mean "the ability to send and recieve packets on layer 3" or "people being able to conduct business electronically, with some reasonable expectation of the confidentiality, integrity and reliability of their transactions." So, it all depends on what you mean by the Internet:) I think this is an extremely important discussion to have on the list, I just think it should be framed in terms of real risks, root causes, and potential solutions. :I am looking for anything that might be a potential attack point. I don't :want to start a flame war, but any interesting or even way out there idea :is welcome. : :Is it feasible that a coordinated attack could shutdown the entire net? I :am not talking DDoS. What if someone actually had the skills to disrupt :BGP on a widescale? Once you start thinking about the Internet from a security perspective, you realize there is no "entire net" subject to the sum of its parts in any practical sense. It is a network of networks that serves a continuum of interests, bounded by economics, and driven by porn. ;) The attack point is anywhere you think will do the most harm to the people you dislike. If you just want to break something, find serious, easy to exploit, security design limitations in BGP, MPLS, BIND and drive a major global backbone like UUNet into insolvency. ..What? Oh ...Too late. -- batz
|