North American Network Operators Group

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Re: Operational Content only please.

  • From: George William Herbert
  • Date: Wed Sep 12 04:41:56 2001

Todd Suiter <[email protected]> wrote:
>Also, the long term repercussions of today's events may well be
>staggering for this group, and our industries as a whole. [...]

Just a few off the top of my head:
1) Physical risk to facilities
	This is a nightmare, most of our facilities *suck*.
	Run an intrusion scenario against anything but the
	absolute primo colo facilities and you walk right
	in the door, and the primo ones are vulnerable to
	mild levels of professional active threat (rocket,
	bomb, wall breach, etc).  There is too much money
	in some of those buildings to treat this as lazily
	as we do now.  

2) Assured physically separate routing links
	The current situation is unacceptable.  We need to know
	where our circuits physically go, and when that changes,
	and have real options for physical routing.

3) Disaster recovery plans for facilities dropped into a hole in the ground
	My current contract had just deferred a major expansion
	on this issue.  They're in a building clearly identifyable
	on the San Francisco skyline.  I expect this to be a major
	reassessment starting tomorrow.  You, too...

4) Echelon / snooping / crypto privacy issues
	What sorts of likely issues will we see if there is
	enhanced government monitoring mandated as a result
	of this?

5) Services provider load-handling
	I was chatting with someone at throughout the morning.
	They had to roll literally dozens and dozens of additional
	servers into service when the hits started rolling in after
	the incident was reported first.  It looks like everyone was
	able to hold on in both the network and the source provider
	side... but this needs a careful look for lessons learned.

-george william herbert
[email protected]