North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical RE: ISP contracts and government intervention
> order does not exist to prevent or stop suck service. The only This should say "such service". Freudian slip, perhaps. > "credentials" > someone needs is a positive return on a Dun and Bradstreet credit report. > Paying in advance tends to get around even that. > > Check out HavenCo, and it's purpose. I think it may be the sort > of thing you > are looking for, although I would certainly never call it a "blackhat" > operation, as it is completely above board, just not interested in > government (over)regulation. > > ("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who > wear such > figurative headgear on NANOG) > > - Daniel Golding > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]On Behalf Of > > [email protected] > > Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 2:16 AM > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: ISP contracts and government intervention > > > > > > Apologies in advance for the non-technical nature of the query. I > > am a law > > student researching a law review article on censorship on the Internet. > > My partner and I are investigating the legal consequences of > > placing a ISP > > offshore, in a jurisdiction like Anguilla, Nevis, the Caymen Islands or > > some other place like that. Part of our problem is that we're > ignorant of > > the business practice in the area. I figured I'd go to the > horse's mouth, > > rather than playing footsie on the legal lists. > > > > Its probable that the ISP could be run in an offshore jursidiction with > > strong financial secrecy regulations and any U.S.-based managers/owners > > would be insulated from legal action because they could not be > identified > > (at least, with American subponeas.) On the other hand, a U.S. > > judge could > > presumably order the offshore ISP's U.S.-based upstream ISP to > > cut off that > > ISP (or even the entire jurisdiction, depending on the situation) > > for DMCA > > violations, gambling, etc. Basically, its an issue of how the community > > would go about dealing with a blackhat ISP. > > > > An initial question is how closely do backbone providers/upstream > > ISPs look > > at offshore ISPs to begin with? What kind of identification/credentials > > does an ISP need to come up with to get a contract? Specifically, > > do backbone > > providers figure out who the beneficial owner of an ISP is before > > they hook > > up the ISP? If someone pays the bills regularly, do they need > > anything more > > than what's in whois.arin.net? > > > > The next set of questions deal with how long a blackhat ISP could > > stay connected. > > Under what circumstances would an upstream ISP/backbone provider cut off > > the offshore ISP before a court order? What are the choices in > the market > > for backbone providers that are not U.S.-based (and therefore > wouldn't be > > subject to U.S. legal process)? > > > > Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at www.hushmail.com >
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