North American Network Operators Group

Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical

CERT Advisory CA-2000-69

  • From: jamie
  • Date: Mon Jul 10 16:04:25 2000


CERT Advisory CA-2000-69 AIBO Authentication Algorithm Corruption Vulnerability

   Original Release Date: July 10, 2000
   Last Revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems affected

   * AIBO ERS-110 Aperios OS
   * AIBO ERS-111 Aperios OS

Overview

   A vulnerability involving the Visual authentication algorithm has recently
been identified in the Sony, Inc. "AIBO" Entertainment Robot.  Owners of AIBO
Robots are encouraged to upgrade their Aperios DogOS soon as possible.

   The AttackBite() control has a serious vulnerability that allows remote
intruders within earshot of AIBO to execute arbitrary code.  Scripts are
proliferating the Internet with new routines such as PeeOnRug(), ShoeChew(),
KillTheCat() and AttackOwnersGenitals().  The latter, classified by CERT as
a "Denial of Service" attack, is most vicious, and for this reason CERT
encourages immediate patch implementation.  Some common cicrumstances under
which this vulnerability can be exploited are addressed by the Sony patch;
others are not.

I. Description

   There are at least three distinct vulnerabilities in the ERS-110 and
ERS-111 implementation of the Aperios software.  All of these vulnerabilities
may be exploited to effect Quicker-Picker-Upper and Owner Discomfort attacks
with varying degrees of severity.  Owners are advised, until patch completion,
to guard themselves, and to have extra paper towels on hand.

   - The AIBO Sound Controller, when configured to play Britney Spears'
"Oops, I Did It Again," will cause AIBO to lift a hind leg and spontaneously
leak battery juice on the floor, simulating a urination (female ERS-110
models "squat" during this exploit).

   - The buffer used to hold the variable MyOwner in the function
process_face() can be overflowed, reverting AIBO into experimental
AiboPitBull code.  When combined with the Sound Controller's Performance
Mode signal, unpatched AIBO units can receive arbitrary code, and multiple
reports of owner emasculation have been reported.

   - (Unverified) Owners who accidentally have left their television on late
at night have reported incidents of AIBO attacking their small children
and pets within minutes of the airing of "Tom Vu's Real Estate Seminar,"
The Story of A Vietnamese Immigrant's rags-to-riches Infomercial.

   - Two reports have been submitted where a race condition involving
Tom Vu's Real Estate Seminar and presence of Richard Simmons' "Farewell
to Fat" have caused AIBO units to "die".  We are still investigating this.


II. Impact

   Depending on the version of AIBO, the environment in which it is running,
and the particular vulnerability that is exploited, a remote attacker can
cause one or more of the following:

   - The AIBO to attack its owner,
   - The AIBO to wake, walk off its base station and attack children/pets,
   - The AIBO to generate Cyber-Body-Fluid and/or Excretion, and/or
   - The AIBO to die.


III. Solution

   Upgrade your version of AIBO Aperios DogOS

  If you are running vulnerable Aperios and cannot upgrade, you are
strongly advised to remove the battery from AIBO's behind and contact
Sony for more assistance.



Appendix A. Vendor Information

Sony, Inc.

  Please see

  http://www.world.sony.com/robot/aperios_vuln.htm


Richard Simmons

  Please see

  http://www.richardsimmons.com/shop/info.idc?id=08-00164



   _________________________________________________________________

   The CERT Coordination Center thanks your Mom and Eva Peron for their
   help in developing this advisory.
   _________________________________________________________________

   Author: Jamie Rishaw <[email protected]>
   _________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
        http://arpa.com/advisories/CERT-2000-69.html
   _________________________________________________________________

   (This is a spoof, if you haven't gotten it by now)
   _________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: [email protected]
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
          U.S.A.

   CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
   Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
   hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
   Our public PGP key is available from

   http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

   If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
   information.

Getting security information

   CERT publications and other security information are available from
   our web site

   http://www.cert.org/

   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
   email to [email protected] and include SUBSCRIBE
   your-email-address in the subject of your message.

   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.

   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" had absolutely nothing to
   do with this advisory, and do not support it.  It's a parody.

   NO WARRANTY
   Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
   Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
   Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
   implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
   fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
   results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
   does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
   patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
   _________________________________________________________________

   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

Revision History
July 10, 2000: Initial Release