North American Network Operators Group|
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Re: using IRR tools for BGP route filtering
I believe every major backbone has suffered a multi-hour service disruption due to another provider announcing blackhole routes. The most recent one was Sprint a couple of weeks ago when another major provider re-announced part of their network in Chicago. Its not just a risk from "small" providers like 7007. Most of the widely distributed bogus announcements pass through large providers like Spring and UUNET. Most bogus announcements only affect a single network customer, like the FCC web site, so some people just assume its usual Internet flakiness when they can't reach a network. Its strange to see carriers whose management wouldn't think of ignoring the LERG, believe its ok to risk extended service disruptions by announcing and listening to unfiltered, unauthenticated routing information. Are engineers keeping their managers' in the dark. Does management not know there is a potential solution to the problem. Or does their management really think its Ok their customers are at risk of losing service at any time due to unfiltered routes. When you speak with your Cisco sales rep, do you tell them one of the requirements is being able to filter the entire route table with multiple peers.