North American Network Operators Group

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Re: Bellovin sez...

  • From: Eric Sobocinski
  • Date: Fri Feb 20 14:48:37 1998

They could, that is, unless everyone to whom the hacker attached was
doing ingress BGP filtering for all peers/downstreams.  I'm sure my
Merit RA comrades would be glad to jump in with a plug that IRR and
route servers could help facilitate this, as would the varied groups
that are working on authenticating network allocations of incoming
routes.  But that of course was your point.  :-)

--eric <ducking in case he started a religious war>

On Fri, 20 Feb 1998 at 09:29 PST, Michael Dillon <[email protected]> wrote:
> Here's a quote from this story
>    Both Bellovin and his AT&T colleague Matt Blaze cited the vulnerability
>    of the Net's decentralized routing system, ....  This routing
>    information has been accidentally corrupted several times, they said,
>    resulting in massive traffic flows being rerouted through single slow
>    machines or blocked altogether.
>    They said a hacker could also cause this kind of corruption. 
> --
> Michael Dillon                   -               Internet & ISP Consulting
>             -               E-mail: [email protected]