North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical Re: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls
On Thu, Sep 04, 1997 at 09:23:49AM -0400, Selina F. Priestley wrote: > Let's turn this into a useful conversation: If we do not believe that getting > a backdoor to our keys is a useful way to insure security on the network, maybe > isn't even addressing the root issues, then Nope, it's not. "Ensuring security" implies making certain that _no one_ can get copies of the keys; the entire thesis is shot down by key-escrow. > What *are* the real issues with security on the network? How should we work to > address these issues, both at the network and application layers? How will this > solve the 'child porn problem'? What are the barriers involved in any proposed > solutions? The real issue _here_ is that the government _does not want_ us to operate 'secure' networks... because then _they_ can't look at the traffic. (CALEA notwithstanding) Oh, and BTW: in light of CALEA, why do they _care_ if they can crack the code? We're required to help them tap the cleartext anyway... (at least, for _network imposed_ encryption). > How can we trace criminals/spam artists/hackers easily and hand them over to > the feds w/o handing over our rights as well? Short answer: we can't. > If we don't have any answers to these questions, and plans for getting there, > then we might as well quit our bitching. As Clancy once put it: you can be a policeman of a soldier... but not both. Are we network operators, or cops? I think we've probably reached the end of the "useful operational content" in this thread... unless anyone has a "this is what _we_ did" story. Cheers, -- jra -- Jay R. Ashworth [email protected] Member of the Technical Staff Unsolicited Commercial Emailers Sued The Suncoast Freenet "People propose, science studies, technology Tampa Bay, Florida conforms." -- Dr. Don Norman +1 813 790 7592
|