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North American Network Operators Group Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical NET99 sabotages IGC's routes
IGC (Internet Gateway Connections, an ISP in Florida that was multihomed between NET99 and MCI) just had an unexpected outage lasting in excess of an hour. This outage was deliberately engineered by AGIS/NET99. First, a little history: IGC's first 'Net T1 was to NET99. Instead of connecting us directly to their backbone (as we had expected) they connected us to Netrunner (one of our competitors). Netrunner/NET99 only has a single T1 out of Miami (to Atlanta) and as a result, our throughput was awful and we obtained an additional T1 to MCI. A few days ago, someone at Netrunner got upset with someone at NET99/AGIS and shut off _our_ service. For some reason (we strongly suspect a configuration error at NET99) our traffic failed to reroute over our MCI T1 for several hours. (They have a habit of broadcasting static routes to route around outages, thus completely screwing their multi-homed customers.) We asked AGIS for a one month refund to compensate us for our losses due to the sabotage. Instead, they issued us a _one_day_ credit. We got upset, both with the ability of our T to pass traffic, with NET99's continual routing problems, with NET99's backbone being disassembled from under us, and with NET99/AGIS's continual delays in migrating us to the AGIS network. We asked them to discontinue our service. They did. They also deliberately and maliciously began broadcasting more specific routes for the individual class C networks in our CIDR block. (We confirmed this with MCI.) When I spoke to AGIS about the outage, they told me I had to speak with Randy Epstein. Randy Epstein is the person at IGC who made the decision to discontinue our AGIS/NET99 service. I contacted MCI again and they contacted AGIS/NET99 with the ultimate threat being for MCI to stop carrying AGIS' traffic if they would not cease broadcasting the bogus routes. Shortly after being contacted by MCI, AGIS/NET99 stopped announcing the bogus routes to MCI, but continued advertising these routes to their other peers at the NAPs. Fortunately, MCI was able to reconfigure our access lists at their router to allow us to broadcast competing more specific routes for each individual class C in the CIDR block. Thus (more or less) restoring IGC's net connectivity. NET99's deliberate, malicious actions are contrary to the very spirit of the Internet. They resulted in DALnet (the third largest IRC network) being split to ribbons, depriving 2,500 people of the ability to converse with each other and cutting off DALnet's security and access control system which is hosted here. Please excuse me if this is not the appropriate forum for discussing this event. David Schwartz Director of Network Services Internet Gateway Connections (954)-430-3030
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